Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 17/10/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21

CARRILLO-TUDELLA Carlos (U of Essex)

Matching through Search Channels

Firms and workers predominately match via job postings, networks of personal contacts or the public employment agency, all of which help to ameliorate labor market frictions. We investigate how firms' differential use of these search channels impacts workers' turnover, wage inequality and labor market sorting. Using novel linked survey-administrative data we document each channel's separate role for matching high-wage firms and high-wage workers and for job mobility. To evaluate the relevance of these search channels for employment, wages and sorting, we structurally estimate an equilibrium job ladder model featuring two-sided heterogeneity and endogenous recruitment effort in multiple search technologies. The estimation reveals that job postings are the most instrumental channel for positive worker-firm sorting. Although the public employment agency provides lower hiring rates for firms, its removal has sizeable consequences, with aggregate employment declining by 1.4 percent and rising bottom wage inequality, but little effect on sorting.