Calendrier du 17 mars 2020
Du 17/03/2020 de 16:30 à 19:00
PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris,
SPITZER Yannay(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
BEINE Michel(University of Luxemburg)
FACCHINI Giovanni(University of Nottingham)
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Texte intégral
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 17/03/2020 de 16:30 à 19:00
PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, Salle R1-09
RAVALLION Martin (Georgetown University)
BEINE Michel(University of Luxemburg)
CANCELLED: Assessing the Role of Immigration Policy for Foreign Students: the Case of Campus France
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 17/03/2020 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014, Paris - salle R2-21
GANAPATI Sharat (Georgetown)
POSTPONED
écrit avec Woan Foong Wong (University of Oregon) and Oren Ziv (Michigan State University)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/03/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GALBIATI Roberto (Sciences-Po)
Wealth Accumulation and Institutional Capture: the Rise of the Medici and the Fall of the Florentine Republic - REPORTÉ
écrit avec Marianna Belloc, Francesco Drago, Mattia Fochesato
We study the rise of the Medici family and the fall of the Florentine Republic in the 15th
century. In this period, political offices were assigned by a system which combined elections and
selection by lot. During the 1420s, the Medici family increased its influence and de facto captured
the system of office allocation while leaving the political institutions formally unchanged. We
use data on the results of the drawings for the four main government offices of the city between
1395 and 1457 and match them with data on individual wealth at different points in time
in the 15th century. Our analysis documents the systematic capture of the process of office
allocation in favor of individuals belonging to the Medici’s network. When we move to the
analysis of the relationship between wealth and political office holders, we show that after the
Medici’s institutional soft-capture, holding a political office is strongly and directly associated
with individual wealth accumulation, especially for office holders from the Medici faction. By
contrast, we find a very limited effect between the number of terms in office and individual wealth
before the rise of the Medici to political power. By comparing results for the two periods, before
and after the institutional capture, and using complementary data sources, we provide several
pieces of evidence that explain our findings in terms of collusion and rent extraction.