Calendrier du 17 mai 2018
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 17/05/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
IOVINO Luigi (Bocconi)
Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies without Rational Expectations
écrit avec Dmitriy Sergeyev
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 17/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
DOYLE Joseph (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Measuring Physician Quality: Evidence from Physician Availability
Measuring physician quality is fundamental to understanding healthcare productivity, yet attempts to estimate the types of physicians that improve survival can be confounded due to patient sorting. This paper aims to overcome this endogeneity problem by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the mix of physicians available to treat the patient on the particular date of an inpatient admission. One innovation is the use of 100% Medicare claims data to characterize the mix of physicians available including specialty training, medical school quality rankings, patient volume, sex, and years of experience. When heart failure patients enter the hospital when more cardiologists are available, patients receive more intensive treatments and are more likely to survive at one year. The results speak to the debate over the value of treatment intensity and specialists in particular.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 17/05/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R1-15, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BOUACIDA Elias (PSE)
Consistency of Choice Correspondences: a Theoretical and an Empirical Study.
Experiments in economics generally elicit a choice function: for a given choice set, a decision maker chooses exactly one alternative. It is a restriction on most models of revealed preferences, that start with a choice correspondence: for a given choice set, a decision maker chooses a subset of alternatives. This paper explores the impact of this restriction on the formulation of revealed preferences axioms and on the consistency of observed behaviors. In order to do so, a new methodology is built to elicit a choice correspondence in an incentive compatible way, called pay-for-certainty. We introduce a new theoretical requirements, increasing chosen set that guarantees the elicitation of a proper choice correspondence with the pay-for-certainty methodology.
We implement the methodology in the laboratory and compare it to choice functions. 40.13% of observed choices are singletons and only 2.33% of subjects have single-peaked preferences. Increasing chosen set is verified by 60.47% of the subjects in the relevant case. 46.51% of all choices correspondences verify WARP whereas 58.82% of all choice functions do.
In a second step, we use the pay-for-certainty methodology to explore the completeness of preferences assumptions, a task impossible with choice functions. We assess degrees of incomplete preferences. A lower bound introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006) explains only 2.68% of observed behaviors. We characterized and upper bound. It is equivalent to the decision maker maximizing a strict partial preference. It explains 14.77% of observed behaviors. These results points to the relevance of observing choice correspondences instead of choice functions when a choice correspondence is needed to test a theory. .
Behavior seminar
Du 17/05/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
New building R2-21
ELLIS Randall (Department of Economics Boston University)
Provider Agency, Health Care Innovation, Pricing, and Regulations: (or How to Reduce Health Care Spending by 50 Percent)
Behavior Working Group
Du 17/05/2018 de 10:00 à 11:00
R2-20
CETRE Sophie (PSE - Sciences Po)
Do incentives conflict with fairness