Calendrier du 17 mai 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 17/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
D. MARIANI Rama (University of Rome, Tor Vergata and CEIS)
Immigrant Supply of Marketable Child Care and Native Fertility in Italy
écrit avec with F.C Rosati
The availability of child-care services has often been advocated as one of the instruments to counter the fertility decline observed in many high-income countries. In the recent past large inflows of low-skilled migrants have substantially increased the supply of child-care services. In this paper we examine if immigration as actually affected fertility exploiting the natural experiment occurred in Italy in 2007, when a large inflow of migrants – many of them specialized in the supply of child care – arrived unexpectedly. With a difference-in-differences method, we show that immigrant female workers have increased native births by a number that ranges roughly from 2 to 4 per cent. We validate our result by the implementation of an instrumental variable approach and several robustness tests, all concluding that the increase in the supply of child-care services by immigrant women has positively affected native fertility.
Texte intégral
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 17/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
MADSEN Erik (NYU)
Incentive Design for Talent Discovery
écrit avec Co-authors : Basil Williams, Andrzej Skrzypacz
In many organizations, employees enjoy significant discretion regarding project selection. If projects differ in their informativeness about an employee’s quality, project
choices will be distorted whenever career concerns are important. We analyze a model
in which an organization can shape its employees’ career concerns by committing to
a system for allocating a limited set of promotions. We show that the organization
optimally overpromotes certain categories of underperforming employees, trading off
efficient matching of employees to promotions in return for superior project selection.
When organizations can additionally pay monetary bonuses, we find that overpromotion is a superior incentive tool when the organization needs to offer high-powered
incentives; otherwise, bonuses perform better.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 17/05/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/97399860624?pwd=QlA3TGtITGNtZkpuT0VLSDVUMllCdz09
SZTAJEROWSKA Monika (PSE)
Investor-State Dispute Settlement in Investment Agreements: Bringing Evidence to Controversy
écrit avec Emily Blanchard (Dartmouth Tuck School of Business, CEPR)
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is central feature of the more-than 3,000 international investment agreements in place today. Despite their ubiquity, ISDS provisions are the subject of increasingly heated public debate about national sovereignty, corporate interests, and the limits of international agreements. To what extent are ISDS provisions simply the necessary conditions for mutually beneficial cross-border investments? How, if at all, has the use of these provisions changed over time? While ISDS has received recent attention in the theoretical trade literature (e.g. Kohler and Stähler, 2019; Ossa, Sykes and Staiger, 2020; Schjelderup and Stähler, 2021), remarkably little is known about the use of ISDS provisions in practice. This paper leverages a new, unique ISDS case- and firm-level dataset to present novel stylised facts about the nature and evolution of the ISDS system, multinational firms using it, law firms involved, and the underlying market mechanisms that drive the patterns and prevalence of ISDS cases. Analysis is structured around two key questions. First, to what extent has there been a fundamental change in the prevalence, composition, and underlying nature of ISDS cases? And second, what are the likely drivers of these patterns — specifically, are there discernible changes in “litigation technology” that have changed when, how, and why firms use ISDS provisions in practice?
Régulation et Environnement
Du 17/05/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
PICCOLO Salvatore (University of Bergamo)
On the Private and Social Value of Consumer Datain Vertically-Integrated Platform Markets
écrit avec Co-authors : Jorge Padilla, Helder Vasconcelos
We characterize and compare the private and social incentives to collect consumer data by a
vertically-integrated online intermediary who competes with third-party sellers listed on its platform
and is required by regulation to share with rivals all the information it gathers. With linear intermediation fees and price competition, the intermediary over-invests in accuracy compared to the social optimum when the intra-platform competition is sufficiently weak and when demand is not too responsive to quality. By contrast, the intermediary tends to under-invest in accuracy when the intra-platform competition is strong enough, and demand is sufficiently responsive to quality. With quantity competition, the intermediary always over-invests in accuracy. Importantly, when consumers exhibit privacy concerns, the over-investment problem worsens, whereas the under-investment problem mitigates. We also investigate the impact of alternative (non-linear) contractual arrangements.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 17/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
FLESCH Janos (Maastricht University)
A competitive search game with a moving target
The talk is based on two papers. The first is joint work with Benoit Duvocelle, Mathias Staudigl, Dries Vermeulen, and the second with Benoit Duvocelle, Hui Min Shi, Dries Vermeulen.
Abstract: We introduce a discrete-time search game, in which two players compete to find an object first. The object moves according to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. The players know the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution of the object, but do not observe the current state of the object. The players are active in turns. The active player chooses a state, and this choice is observed by the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, the active player wins and the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the Markov chain and the game continues at the next period. We show that this game admits a value, and for any error-term epsilon>0, each player has a pure (subgame-perfect) epsilon-optimal strategy. Interestingly, a 0-optimal strategy does not always exist. We derive results on the properties of the value and the epsilon-optimal strategies. Moreover, we examine the performance of the finite truncation strategies. We devote special attention to the time-homogeneous case, where additional results hold. We also investigate a related model, where the active player is chosen randomly at each period. In this case, the results are quite different, and greedy strategies (which always recommend to choose a state that contains the object with the highest probability) play the main role