Calendrier du 18 février 2016
Development Economics Seminar
Du 18/02/2016 de 14:30 à 16:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
DO Quy-Toan (The World Bank)
Pirates of Somalia: Crime and Deterrence on the High Seas
Piracy off the coast of Somalia took the world by surprise when, within a six-year span (2005-2011), around 1,100 ships were attacked, among which more than 200 were successfully hijacked. In 2012 however, attacks had plummeted with, no new hijacking reported between 2013 and mid-2015. We quantitatively investigate the roles of two crime deterrence measures widely believed to be responsible for the collapse of Somali piracy: the deployment of international navies in pirate-infested waters and the provision of armed security guards onboard vessels. Using unique data on attacks, hijacks, and ransoms to calibrate a structural model of Somali piracy, we estimate the elasticity of crime with respect to deterrence and highlight the positive and negative spillovers generated by the private adoption of onboard armed security. We discuss counterfactual scenarios obtained by varying the intensity and composition of deterrence measures.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 18/02/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
FAVART Thomas (PSE)
Collusion in Capacity Under Irreversible Investment
This work studies the possibility of collusion under irreversible investment in production capacity. The irreversibility of investment has two effects. It reduces the profitability of short run deviation, as the deviating firm has to invest in order to increase its capacity. It also creates a long run effect. Once the deviating firm has invested, it is committed to its new capacity. The deviation may thus lead to a preemption of the punishing firm. When the firms become more patient, the short run profitability of a deviation increases whereas the long run profitability is reduced. When the second effect dominates, collusion is harder to sustain for more patient firm. This contrasts with the literature on collusion. Finally, this work shows that the smallest firm has the most incentives to deviate.