Calendrier du 18 février 2019
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 18/02/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
CANTILLON Estelle (Université Libre de Bruxelles)
What is price discovery achieving in the New Zealand electricity market ?
écrit avec Stefan Bergheimer
Wholesale electricity markets solve a complex allocation problem: electricity is not storable, demand is uncertain, production is inelastic in the short run and can involve indivisibilities. The New Zealand wholesale electricity market attempts to solve this complex allocation problem by using a price and quantity discovery mechanism that ends one hour before dispatch. We show that while the existing mechanism may help deal with production efficiency, it facilitates the exertion of market power. We provide preliminary evidence about this tradeoff and document the role played by this price and quantity mechanism in this market.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 18/02/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
WANG Olivier (NYU Stern)
Identification and Estimation of Demand for Bundles
écrit avec Alessandro Iaria
We study the identification and estimation of a mixed logit model of demand for bundles. We generalize the model proposed by Gentzkow (2007) in three ways. First, we allow the demand synergies among products (capturing complementarity and substitutability) to be bundle-individual specific and treated as random coefficients. Second, we allow the joint distribution of the random coefficients to belong to any parametric family. Third, our arguments are not specific to the three-bundle case but are directly developed for choice sets of any size. We propose sufficient conditions for identification and for lack of it. Our sufficient conditions for identification also guarantee consistency and asymptotic normality of a constrained MLE (MPEC) that alleviates the curse of dimensionality inherent in estimation, and it is robust to both price endogeneity and sampling error in the observed market shares. We use our methods to investigate the welfare implications of mixed bundling pricing in the ready-to-eat cereal industry in the USA. The profit gains of mixed bundling pricing with respect to pure components pricing are sharply decreasing in the level of competition: while a monopolist would benefit from mixed bundling, the observed oligopoly would not—even ignoring potential increases in logistics costs. Given any market structure, mixed bundling leads to lower levels of consumer surplus than pure components.