Calendrier du 18 mars 2021
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 18/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:45
Using Zoom
CARDOSO Ana Rute (IAE - CSIC)
Collective Bargaining in a Continental European Setting
écrit avec David Card (University of California Berkeley)
Sectoral contracts in many European countries set minimum wage floors for different occupation groups. In addition, employers often pay an extra premium (a wage cushion) to individual workers. We use administrative data from an annual census of employees in Portugal, linked to collective bargaining agreements, to study the interactions between wage floors and wage cushions and assess the impact of wage floors. We show that wages exhibit a spike at the wage floor, but that a typical worker receives a 20% premium over the floor, with wide variation across workers and firms. Flexibility of cushions allows mean wages to respond to firm-specific productivity differences even within the same sectoral agreement. New contract negotiations tend to raise all wage floors proportionally, with increases that reflect average productivity growth among covered firms. As floors rise, however, wage cushions are eroded, leading to an average pass-through rate of only about one-half. We also found no evidence of employment responses to floor increases. Finally, we use a series of counterfactual simulations to show that real wage reductions during the recent financial crisis were facilitated by reductions in real wage floors (-2.2 ppts), reductions in real cushions (-2.5 ppts), and the re-allocation of workers to lower wage floors (-4.8 ppts). Offsetting these effects was a rapid rise in share of workers at higher education levels, which in the absence of other factors would have led to rising real wages.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 18/03/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
BI Wei (European University Institute)
Adverse Selection with Dynamic Learning
Most of the current literature about adverse selection in the dynamic game form assumes that the information asymmetry exists ex ante while I build a search model (the seller samples the buyers and the buyers make the offer) to characterize the case where the information asymmetry evolves as time goes on and study the agents' behavior. I find the condition such that the market is efficient in which case all sellers could make a trade whatever their types. Furthermore, I study how the agents' behavior changes when they are bounded rational. I first consider a situation where the coarse buyer forms an expectation of the value from the trade, which is unconditional on whether the seller will accept his offer. I find that he tends to overbid if the information asymmetry exacerbates. Secondly, I consider the coarse buyer expects the seller's behavior as if it was stationary conditional on the state. I find that when the adverse selection effect is significant, he will not make a higher offer compared to the rational one.
Behavior seminar
Du 18/03/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
LEBRETON Mael (PSE)
*Generosity Biases the Learning of Cultural Conventions
Human groups can markedly differ in fairness and cooperation norms, and these differences can create intergroup misunderstandings and conflict. At the same time, humans also trade and travel across cultural divides, suggesting that they can learn and adapt to new culture-specific conventions and rules of engagement. While such adaptions avoid intergroup conflict and benefit intergroup exchange, how humans learn group-specific rules that are often implicit and distinct from already learned values and norms remains poorly understood. Here we examine this fundamental learning process underlying social rule acquisition. We created three populations with different yet unobservable rules of engagement and varied whether or not decisions affected interaction partner outcomes. Participants made bargaining offers to responders from these different populations and could observe whether their offer was accepted or rejected. Participants quickly adapted to group-specific rules in learning environments without social consequences, but were overly generous and ended up misrepresenting what would be acceptable when decisions affected their partner’s outcomes. We propose a computational model, combining Bayesian principles and social preferences, that mechanistically explains how generosity leads to biased sampling, impeded learning, and false beliefs about what offers are deemed acceptable. Using functional neuroimaging, we mapped key computational variables in two major brain networks, previously associated with value-based and social decision-making. Results suggest that generosity, related to brain regions associated with decision-conflict and perspective-taking, can induce self-fulfilling beliefs in pro-sociality norms that may help to increase cooperation and reduce conflict between distinct groups but also create inaccurate stereotypes and economic inefficiencies.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 18/03/2021 de 10:00 à 11:30
REIS Ricardo (London School of Economics)
The constraint on public debt when r is smaller than g but g is smaller than m: joint with Lecture Chaire Banque de France
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