Calendrier du 18 avril 2019
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 18/04/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
ZHENG Yu (QMUL)
Innovate to Lead or Innovate to Prevail: When do Monopolistic Rents Induce Growth?
écrit avec Roberto Piazza
This paper embeds in a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model a previously overlooked insight that the cost of innovation to the followers increases in their technological distance to the leader. This new assumption introduces an incentive for the leader to innovate to increase his technological distance from the followers, reducing the risk of being leapfrogged and thus prevailing in the leadership game. In addition to the High Growth steady state in which only followers innovate as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), there now exist two other steady states: a Medium Growth (a source) and a Low Growth (a saddle) steady state, that feature both leaders and followers innovating. With an initial condition of the economy that sees many industries having leaders prevailing – a situation characterized by low dynamism - the economy eventually converges to a Low Growth steady state. We illustrate in the model how an increase in monopolistic rents to the leaders, depending on the initial condition, can increase or reduce aggregate growth in the long run.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 18/04/2019 de 12:30 à 13:45
MARIE Olivier (Erasmus School of Economics)
Risky Moms, Risky Kids: Fertility and Crime after the Fall of the Wall
écrit avec Co-author: Arnaud Chevalier
We study the link between parental selection and children criminality using a natural experiment which dramatically affected fertility decisions. Following the collapse of the communist regime in East Germany in 1989 the number of births more than halved. As well as in size, these cohorts markedly differ in parental composition. We assess whether this resulted in changes in these children’s criminal participation. We find that were almost 30 percent more likely to be arrested, that this huge effect is observed for most offence types, and that it is as strong for both genders. We highlight a new mechanism linking fertility and crime: the inter-generational transmission of risk preferences from mothers to children which was more pronounced for this cohort and especially for ‘risk loving’ moms.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 18/04/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GALICHON Alfred (New York University)
The equilibrium flow problem
écrit avec Larry Samuelson (Yale) and Lucas Vernet (Sciences Po)
We introduce the 'equilibrium flow problem' as an extension of the classical min-cost flow problem. Applications to trade on networks, demand theory, two-sided matching with and without transfers, and dynamic programming are provided. Existence and structural properties are discussed, as well as a regularized version of the problem.
Behavior seminar
Du 18/04/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
BOL Damien (KCL(UK))
Electoral Rules, Strategic Entry and Polarization
écrit avec Konstantinos Matakos, Orestis Troumpounis, Dimitrios Xefteris
How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model, where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous, we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model.