Calendrier du 19 octobre 2023
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 19/10/2023 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
VIOLANTE Gianluca (Princeton)
Job Amenity Shocks and Labor Reallocation
écrit avec Sadhika Bagga, Lukas Mann and Aysegul Sahin
Du 19/10/2023 de 16:00 à 17:00
R1.14
ROBERTSON Charlotte (Harvard Business School)
Integral Outside: The Marseille Coulisse, the Electric Telegraph, and the Politics of Pricing in Second Empire France
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 19/10/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
SIRUGUE Louis (PSE)
To become or not to become French: Conscription, naturalization, and labor market integration
écrit avec Yajna Govind
We examine the effect of changing naturalization costs on the choice of second-generation migrants to become French, and the labor market effects of citizenship acquisition. We exploit the 1997 reform that abolished compulsory conscription for men born after 1978. It constitutes a drop in naturalization costs because after the reform, obtaining French citizenship is no longer tied to doing the military service. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that this sudden cost reduction induced a jump in naturalization rates. This effect is entirely driven by European Union citizens, for whom the military service cost is binding. We exploit this shock in a synthetic difference-in-differences setting and find that it raised their probability to be in employment by 2 percentage points, mainly through a reduction in inactivity rather than unemployment. We provide suggestive evidence that this effect is mainly driven by an increase in public-sector employment and a reduction in self-employment, and is associated with an enhanced sense of belonging and a reduction in perceived discrimination.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 19/10/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-15
MACKENZIE Andrew (Maastricht University)
Tract housing, the core, and pendulum auctions
écrit avec Andrew Mackenzie and Yu Zhou
We consider a model of tract housing where buyers and sellers have (i) wealth constraints, and (ii) unit demand over identical indivisible objects represented by a valuation. First, we characterize the strong core. Second, we characterize the bilateral weak core, or the weak core allocations with no side-payments. Finally, when buyer wealth constraints and valuations are private information and when transfers are discrete, we introduce two families of pendulum auctions, both of which consist of obviously strategy-proof implementations of the bilateral weak core. The buyer-optimal pendulum auctions are preferred by the buyers but are inefficient when side-payments are possible, while the efficient pendulum auctions are efficient
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 19/10/2023 de 12:30 à 14:00
R2.01
SOUZA Pedro ()
De-Escalation Technology: The Impact of Body-Worn Cameras on Citizen-Police Interactions
écrit avec Daniel Barbosa, Thiemo Fetzer, and Caterina Viaira
We provide experimental evidence that monitoring of police activity through body-worn cameras reduces use of force, handcuffs and arrests, and enhances criminal reporting by the police. Stronger treatment effects occur on events ex-ante classified as low risk. Monitoring effects are moderated by officer rank, which is consistent with a career concern motive by junior officers. We reconcile our estimates with the literature which has, to date, shown mixed results. We rule out the hypothesis that de-policing is occurring due to BWC. Overall, our results show that body-worn cameras robustly de-escalate citizen-police interactions, and we show the mechanisms as to why that happens
Behavior seminar
Du 19/10/2023 de 11:00 à 12:00
P005
BURONE SCHAFFNER Santiago German (University of Antwerp)
Measuring multidimensional well-being when preferences differ: a non-parametric approach
A multidimensional well-being measure that respects individual preference heterogeneity, even when these preferences are incomplete, is presented in this paper. We discuss how the proposed well-being measure can be implemented in a non-parametric way, using the Adaptive Bisectional Dichotomous Choice (ABDC) method (Decancq and Nys, 2021). The ABDC method consists of two steps. In the first step, respondents are presented with a series of dichotomous choices between pairs of life situations that
consist of their actual and hypothetical life situations. Considering three dimensions of well-being (income, health, and social relationships) we measure well-being for a final sample of 2288 Dutch citizens. About 27 percent of respondents indicate to have incomplete preferences over these three dimensions, by selecting the response category ”I don’t know” in the algorithm.
Results indicate that individuals with better health are less likely to answer “I don’t know”, suggesting that individuals have more complete preferences when assessing situations similar to their current lives. On average, respondents are willing to trade off approximately 24% of their income for perfect health and social relationships (although the variability is large). The identification
of the worst-off individuals is dependent on the well-being measure used, underscoring the importance of careful consideration when selecting appropriate measures of well-being. Furthermore, our data enable us to compare three methods for eliciting preferences to estimate our multidimensional measure of well-being: subjective well-being, contingent valuation, and ABDC. The evidence suggests that results are more consistent for individuals with complete preferences.
Behavior Working Group
Du 19/10/2023 de 10:00 à 11:00
R1-14
WEBB Duncan (PSE)
Silence to Solidarity: Using Group Dynamics to Reduce Anti-Transgender Discrimination in India
Discrimination is often believed to be the result of deep-seated prejudice against a minority, or of beliefs that can only change upon the revelation of new information. But social context — in particular, how people behave differently in groups — may be a more important determinant of discrimination than traditional theories of discrimination suggest. This paper shows that involving majority-group members in a group discussion and hiring decision can sharply reduce hiring discrimination against a stigmatized minority. I focus on discrimination against the transgender community in India, a highly visible and economically vulnerable group. In a control condition, participants on average sacri?ce almost double their daily food expenditure to avoid selecting a transgender individual to deliver food to their home. But if they were earlier involved in a group discussion and collective hiring decision with two of their neighbours, they no longer discriminate at all, even when making subsequent choices in private. This effect is stronger than the effect of informing people about the legal rights of transgender people, and the reduction in discrimination partially persists until around 1 month later. The results appear to be driven by the emergence of a strong pro-trans norm in the groups, supported by pro-social reasons for selecting transgender workers that persuade others to discriminate less.