Calendrier du 19 septembre 2019
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 19/09/2019 de 17:00 à 18:00
KSEBI Ilham ()
Disappoined or Satisfied? The Mismatch between Subjective and Objective Position of Immigrants in the Italian Labour Marlet
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 19/09/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
ROULLEAU-PASDELOUP Jordan (NU of Singapore)
Understanding (Linear) Rational Expectations Models
A Rational expectations model is a system of dynamic equations that is used for policy experiments. For a given policy experiment, we want to answer the following question: what is the relative contribution of each equation? In this paper, I develop tools to answer this question. The method revolves around using arbitrary small auxiliary shocks. I show analytically that in the standard linear New Keynesian model GDP and inflation are mostly driven by the Aggregate Supply relationship, unless the economy is at the Zero Lower Bound. I also show that a non-linear version of the model features different relative contributions of Aggregate Supply versus Aggregate Demand relationships depending on whether the economy is in a recession/expansion.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 19/09/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PAHLKE Marieke (PSE)
Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors
This paper explores multi-stage incomplete information games with common ambiguous information about state or types and ambiguity averse players. We characterize a belief formation process that allows players to take their knowledge about the structure of the game into account. This process leads to subjective rectangular ex-ante belief sets for all players. We show that under these belief sets players behave dynamically consistent. Therefore, using our belief formation process, we can generalize the concept of Sequential Equilibria to multi-stage ambiguous incomplete information games and show existence. Furthermore, we show that ambiguity can introduce Sequential Equilibria, that do not exist without ambiguity.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 19/09/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
* * ()
Do European Top Earners React to Taxation Through Migration?
This paper studies the effects of top earnings tax rates on the mobility of top ten percent employees within Europe. I use a novel detailed micro-level dataset on mobility built from the largest European survey (EU-LFS), representative of the entire population of 28 European countries. My estimation strategy exploits the differential effects of changes in top income tax rates on individuals of different propensities to be treated by these changes. I find that top ten percent workers’ location choices are significantly affected by top income tax rates. I estimate an elasticity of the number of top earners with respect to net-of-tax rate that is between 0.1 and 0.3. The mobility response to taxes is especially strong for foreigners, as I estimate an elasticity of the number of foreign top earners with respect to net-of-tax rate that is above one. Turning to tax policy implications, I uncover large heterogeneities in tax competition outcomes within Europe driven by countries’ sizes and tax bases’ compositions, that translate into large differences in incentives to implement beggar-thy-neighbour policies across member states. I formalise these country-level differences using a revenue-maximizing approach that I calibrate with my estimated parameters. Overall, these findings suggest that tax competition entails substantial welfare costs.
Du 19/09/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
TABELLINI Marco(Harvard)
TABELLINI Marco(Harvard)
From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation During the Great Migration
écrit avec : Vasiliki Fouka and Soumyajit Mazumder
How does the appearance of a new immigrant group affect the integration of earlier generations of migrants? We study this question in the context of the first Great Migration (1915–1930), when 1.5 million African Americans moved from the U.S. South to northern urban centers, where 30 million Europeans had arrived since 1850. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation induced by the interaction between 1,900 settlements of southern-born blacks in northern cities and state-level outmigration from the U.S. South after 1910. Black arrivals increased both the effort exerted by immigrants to assimilate and their eventual Americanization. These average effects mask substantial heterogeneity: while initially less integrated groups (i.e., Southern and Eastern Europeans) exerted more assimilation effort, assimilation success was larger for those culturally closer to native whites (i.e., Western and Northern Europeans). Labor market outcomes do not display similar heterogeneity, suggesting that these patterns cannot be entirely explained by economic forces. Our findings are instead more consistent with a framework in which changing perceptions of outgroup distance among native whites lowered the barriers to the assimilation of white immigrants.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 19/09/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
TABELLINI Marco (Harvard)
From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation During the Great Migration
écrit avec Vasiliki Fouka and Soumyajit Mazumder
How does the appearance of a new immigrant group affect the integration of earlier generations of migrants? We study this question in the context of the first Great Migration (1915–1930), when 1.5 million African Americans moved from the U.S. South to northern urban centers, where 30 million Europeans had arrived since 1850. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation induced by the interaction between 1,900 settlements of southern-born blacks in northern cities and state-level outmigration from the U.S. South after 1910. Black arrivals increased both the effort exerted by immigrants to assimilate and their eventual Americanization. These average effects mask substantial heterogeneity: while initially less integrated groups (i.e., Southern and Eastern Europeans) exerted more assimilation effort, assimilation success was larger for those culturally closer to native whites (i.e., Western and Northern Europeans). Labor market outcomes do not display similar heterogeneity, suggesting that these patterns cannot be entirely explained by economic forces. Our findings are instead more consistent with a framework in which changing perceptions of outgroup distance among native whites lowered the barriers to the assimilation of white immigrants.
Behavior seminar
Du 19/09/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
KROGER Sabine (University Laval)
Public good production in heterogeneous groups: An experimental analysis on the relation between external return and information
écrit avec Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling, Erika Seki
In this article, we study voluntary contributions of heterogeneous groups to a public good in an experiment. Members of the same group have either low or high external marginal returns. We vary the level of information about the heterogeneity and about a contributor’s type between groups. While controlling for the net costs of contributions, we find that the level of information determines how types in heterogeneous groups vary in their contributions. When the type of a contributor can be identified, types with high returns contribute more, otherwise the effect disappears or even reverses with low types contributing more than high types. This result provides evidence for the so-called “poisoning-of-the-well” effect and demonstrates how it interacts with the information structure of the environment. Without any information about heterogeneity, there is no difference in contributions by types.