Calendrier du 20 octobre 2022
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 20/10/2022 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
DEBORTOLI Davide (UPF)
Idiosyncratic Income Risk and Aggregate Fluctuations
écrit avec J. Galí
We study the role of idiosyncratic income shocks for aggregate fluctuations within a simple heterogeneous household framework with no binding borrowing constraints. We show that the presence of idiosyncratic income shocks affects the economy’s response to an aggregate shock in a way that can be captured by a consumption weighted average of the changes in uncertainty generated by the shock. We apply this framework to two example economies —an endowment economy and a New Keynesian economy— and show that under plausible calibrations the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks on aggregate fluctuations is quantitatively small, since most of the changes in uncertainty are concentrated among poorer (low consumption) households.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 20/10/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-01
PAUL-VENTURINE Julia ()
Understanding the spatial impacts of land use regulations : the case of risk prevention plans in France
The Lubrizol explosion and the recent floods in Germany reminds that urban areas are exposed to diverse risks. Risks prevention plans (PPR) are a type of land use regulation that intend to tackle externalities deriving from inhabitants and firms choosing to locate in hazardous areas by strictly controlling construction and land use. It also provides objective information to inhabitants about existing risks. I investigate the effects of PPR implementation on local housing markets by exploiting variation in application dates in a difference-in-difference with staggered adoption framework.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 20/10/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DEKEL Amit (PSE)
*Set-Valued Rational Expectations and Farsighted Stability
An abstract game consists of a set of states, preferences over states, and an effectivity correspondence specifying which coalitions are allowed to move from one state to another. Traditional solution concepts used to analyze abstract games under the assumption that players are farsighted (i.e. take into account the entire chain of moves that may follow their own), such as the Farsighted Stable Set or the Largest Consistent Set, do not fully respect the principle of optimizing behavior. This is commonly referred to as the maximality critique. Dutta and Vohra (2017) propose a fix to this problem that comes at the expense of restricting the protocol of play. Ray and Vohra (2019) propose a fix that comes at the expense of scaring existence away. We build on ideas in these papers to propose a fix which is free of such shortcomings. Unlike existing solution concepts, we specify expectations which are set-valued, meaning that several states may be expected to follow any given state. We relate the proposed solution concept to existing ones, discuss its properties, provide necessary conditions for existence, and study its application to strategic and extensive form games.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 20/10/2022 de 12:30 à 14:00
Sciences Po.
MARTINEZ-BRAVO Monica (CEMFI)
The Management of the Pandemic and its Effects on Trust and Accountability
écrit avec with Carlos Sanz (Bank of Spain)
The COVID-19 pandemic took place against the backdrop of growing political polarization and distrust in political institutions in many countries. Furthermore, most governments fell short of expectations regarding preparedness and quality in the management of the pandemic. Did deficiencies in government performance further erode trust in public institutions? Did citizens’ ideology interfere on the way they processed information on their government performance? To investigate both questions, we conducted a pre-registered online experiment in Spain in November 2020. Respondents in the treatment group were provided information on the number of contact tracers in their region, a key policy under the control of regional governments. We find that individuals greatly over-estimate the number of contact tracers in their region. When we provide the actual number of contact tracers, we find: a decline in trust in governments; a reduction on willingness to fund public institutions; and a decrease in COVID-19 vaccine acceptance. We also find that individuals endogenously change their attribution of responsibilities when receiving the treatment. In regions where the regional and central governments are ruled by different parties, sympathizers of the regional incumbent react to the negative news on performance by attributing greater responsibility for it to the central government. We call this the blame shifting effect. In those regions, the negative information does not translate into lower voting intentions for the regional incumbent government. These results suggest that the exercise of political accountability may be particularly difficult in settings with high political polarization and where areas of responsibility are not clearly delineated.
Behavior seminar
Du 20/10/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00
Via Zoom
LEFEBVRE Mathieu (Aix-Marseille University)
*Information Disclosure under liability
We experimentally investigate the impact of information disclosure on managing collective harms that are caused jointly by a group of liable agents. Subjects interact in a public bad setting and must choose ex ante how much to contribute in order to reduce the probability of causing a common damage. If a damage occurs, subjects bear a part of the loss according to the liability-sharing rule in force. We consider two existing rules: a per capita rule and a proportional rule. Our aim is to analyze the relative impact of information disclosure under each rule. We show that information disclosure increases contributions only under a per capita rule. This result challenges the classical results regarding the positive effects of information disclosure, since we show that this impact may depend upon the legal context. We also show that while a proportional rule leads to higher contributions than a per capita one, the positive effect of disclosure on a per capita rule makes it as efficient as a proportional rule without information disclosure.