Calendrier du 20 décembre 2018
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 20/12/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
COMBE Julien (UCL)
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
écrit avec Olivier Tercieux (CNRS & PSE) and Camille Terrier (HEC Lausanne)
The reassignment of teachers to schools is a central issue in education policies. In several countries, this assignment is managed by a central administration that faces a key constraint: ensuring that teachers obtain an assignment that they weakly prefer to their current position. To satisfy this constraint a variation on the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism of Gale and Shapley (1962) has been proposed in the literature and used in practice---for example, in the assignment of French teachers to schools. We show that this mechanism fails to be efficient in a strong sense: we can reassign teachers in a way that i) makes them better-off and ii) better fulfills the administration's objectives represented by the priority rankings of the schools. To address this weakness, we characterize the class of mechanisms that do not suffer from this efficiency loss and elicit a set of strategy-proof mechanisms within this class. To empirically assess the extent of potential gains associated with the adoption of our mechanisms, we use a rich dataset on teachers' applications for transfers in France. These empirical results confirm both the poor performance of the modified DA mechanism and the significant improvements that our alternative mechanisms deliver in terms of teachers' mobility and administration's objectives.
Texte intégral
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 20/12/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
JANNIN Nicolas (Paris School of Economics)
Behavioral responses to local public spending: theory and evidence from French cities
écrit avec Co-author: Aurélie Sotura
This paper revisits the local public good provision debate in a quantitative spatial equilibrium framework. We develop a model in which households are imperfectly mobile across cities that differ in their endogenous wages, rents, local public goods and taxes. Importantly, we allow for three kinds of externalities: public good spillovers (i.e. households enjoy public goods of neighbouring cities), fiscal agglomeration effects (when public goods are not fully rival, bigger cities offer more public good benefits for less taxes) and congestion effects (mobile households congest the public goods of neighbouring cities). Knowing their magnitude is crucial for measuring the inefficiency cost of fiscal decentralization and for designing optimal spatial policies. Our model identifies the key structural parameters behind these externalities and estimates them with GMM using several administrative datasets on French cities. We rely on a new identification strategy that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in investment subsidies to instrument for local public good supply. We notably find significant evidence of spillovers.
Behavior seminar
Du 20/12/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
TOUSSAERT Séverine (LSE London School)
Revealing temptation through menu choice: Evidence from a weight loss challenge
In the context of a weight loss challenge, I use the menu choice approach of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to provide new insights on the link between commitment and temptation. First, I study commitment to eating healthy by eliciting participants’ preferences over a set of lunch reimbursement options, which differed in their food coverage. Extracting information from the entire ordering, I develop measures of temptation to study its source, strength and structure, and validate those measures with survey data. Finally, I test whether temptation revealed through menu choice can predict other behaviors that could be symptomatic of self-control problems, such as take-up of, and performance on, a goal setting contract. In this rich environment, I find a tight link between commitment and temptation. First, nearly 50% of participants strictly preferred a coverage that excluded the foods they rated as most tempting and unhealthy. Second, those who revealed their temptation through menu choice were more likely to take up the contract and less likely to achieve their goals. The elicitation of menu preferences thus offers a promising venue for measuring self-control problems.
Behavior Working Group
Du 20/12/2018 de 10:00 à 10:45
Jourdan, R1-11
JACQUEL Pierre (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES)
The impact of overconfidence on information cascade: A new experimental approach