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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 20 avril 2023

Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 20/04/2023 de 16:00 à 17:15

On Zoom.

DEW-BECKER Ian (Northwestern University)

Junior Research Prize Award: Tail Risk in Production Network




Texte intégral

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 20/04/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris

AGRANOV Marina (Caltech)

*"Information Aggregation on Networks: an Experimental Study"



écrit avec joint work with Ben Gillen and Dotan Persitz




We study the impact of network architecture on the efficiency of information transmission and dynamics of learning in large networks using laboratory experiments. While the theoretical literature has recently made progress in identifying the geometric features of networks that enable the flow of information and those that impede it, the empirical literature lags behind. Our project will fill this gap by designing a novel interface that allows studying the interplay between network architecture and information diffusion in large networks in a controlled laboratory environment. In particular, we address the following questions: How do network structures affect the likelihood of reaching a consensus? Conditional on reaching the consensus, how likely agents are to choose the correct action? How fast convergence occurs? Is it possible at all to observe consensus in large networks? Is it possible to observe connected networks in which agents agree to disagree?

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Du 20/04/2023 de 12:30 à 14:00

Salle R1.15, Campus Jourdan

PERSSON Torsten (IIES)

The Political Economics of Green Transitions" (with Tim Besley). I attach the latest version of this paper





Reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases may be almost impossible without a green transition—a substantial transformation of consumption and production patterns. To study such transitions, we propose a dynamic model, which differs from the common approach in economics in two ways. First, consumption patterns reflect not just changing prices and taxes, but changing values. Transitions of values and technologies create a dynamic complementarity that can help or hinder a green transition. Second, and unlike fictitious social planners, policy makers in democratic societies cannot commit to future policy paths, as they are subject to regular elections. We show that market failures and government failures can interact to prevent a welfare-increasing green transition from materializing or make an ongoing green transition too slow. JEL Codes: D72, D91, Q58.

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 20/04/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09

DOUSSET Léa (PSE)

Women Under-Representation in Mathematics Studies and Careers: Historical Evidence from the Abrogation of Gender Quotas



écrit avec Georgia Thebault




Nowadays, women outnumber men in higher education, but they remain strongly underrepresented in maths-intensive fields, especially among the most competitive institutions. This difference in enrolment partly explains the gender pay gap. We show that a gender quota system could mitigate this phenomenon, using unique hand-collected historical data from 1969 to 2009 on the entrance exam to one of the most competitive elite graduate schools in France, the École normale supérieure (ENS). Before 1986, there were two single-gender schools and entrance exams, which was equivalent to a gender quota system. We document that the merger of the two schools and the introduction of mixed competition led to (i) a sharp fall in the share of female candidates admitted to the mathematics department, from 39 % on average over the ten years before the merger to 9 % on average over the twenty years that followed it, (ii) a decrease in the share of female candidates to the entrance exam, (iii) and a change in the composition of the female candidates pool. We unveil a detrimental shying-away mechanism for female candidates. As the ENS mostly leads to high-level academic careers in France, we also explore the detrimental effect of ending these gender quotas on the gender gap in teaching and research careers for affected students

Behavior seminar

Du 20/04/2023 de 11:00 à 12:00

R2-21

PONTHIÈRE Grégory ()

Epictetusian Rationality





According to Epictetus, mental freedom and happiness can be achieved by distinguishing between, on the one hand, things that are upon our con- trol (our acts, opinions and desires), and, on the other hand, things that are not upon our control (our body, property, offices and reputation), and by wishing for nothing that is outside our control. This article proposes two accounts of Epictetus’s precept: the I account of Epictetus’s precept requires indifference between outcomes differing only on circumstances, whereas the IB account requires indifference between outcomes involving the best replies to circumstances. We study the implications of these precepts on the preference relation and on the existence of Epictetusian rationality. The I account implies that the preference relation satisfies in- dependence of circumstances, whereas the IB account implies robustness to dominated alternatives. Unlike the IB account, the I account rules out (counter)adaptive preferences. Finally, when examining game-theoretical implications of Epictetusian rationality, we show that the two accounts of Epictetus’s precept exclude the existence of prisoner’s dilemmas.