Calendrier du 20 mai 2019
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 20/05/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PEREZ CASTRILLO David (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona )
Conflict-free and Pareto-optimal Allocations in the One-sided Assignment Game: A Solution Concept Weaker than the Core
écrit avec Marilda Sotomayor
In the one-sided assignment game any two agents can form a partnership and decide how to share the surplus created. Thus, in this market, an outcome involves a matching and a vector of payoffs. Contrary to the two-sided assignment game, stable outcomes often fail to exist in the one-sided assignment game. We introduce the idea of conflict-free outcomes: they are individually rational outcomes where no matched agent can form a blocking pair with any other agent, neither matched nor unmatched. We propose the set of Pareto-optimal (PO) conflict-free outcomes, which is the set of the maximal elements of the set of conflict-free outcomes, as a natural solution concept for this game. We prove several properties of conflict-free outcomes and PO conflict-free outcomes. In particular, we show that each element in the set of PO conflict-free payoffs provides the maximum surplus out of the set of conflict-free payoffs, the set is always non-empty and it coincides with the core when the core is non-empty. We further support the set of PO conflict-free outcomes as a natural solution concept by suggesting an idealized partnership formation process that leads to these outcomes. In this process, partnerships are formed sequentially under the premise of optimal behavior and two agents only reach an agreement if both believe that more favorable terms will not be obtained in any future negotiations.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 20/05/2019 de 13:00 à 14:00
Campus MSE - Room 19
LAENGLE Katharina (Université Paris 1 - PSE) *;
La séance est annulée
Du 20/05/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
BIANCINI Sara (Université de Cergy)
*
Régulation et Environnement
Du 20/05/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
BIANCINI Sara (Université de Cergy)
Mission Drift in Microcredit: A Contract Theory Approach
écrit avec David Ettinger, Baptiste Venet
We analyze the relationship between Micro
nance Institutions (MFIs) and external funding
institutions, with the aim of contributing to the debate on mission drift (the tendency
for MFIs to lend money to wealthier borrower rather than to the very poor). We suggest
that funding institutions build incentives for MFIs to choose the adequate share of poorer
borrowers and to exert effort to increase the quality of the funded projects. We show that
asymmetric information on both the effort level and its cost may increase the share of richer
borrowers. However the unobservability of the cost of effort has an ambiguous effect. It
pushes efficient MFIs to serve a higher share of poorer borrowers, while less efficient ones
decrease their poor outreach.
JEL codes: O12, O16, G21.
Keywords: Micro
nance, Funding Institutions, Mission Drift, Contract Theory.