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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 21 novembre 2022

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 21/11/2022 de 17:00 à 18:15

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris

DENTI Tommaso (Cornell University)

*"Blackwell correlated equilibrium" (joint with D. Ravid)





We develop a method for making robust predictions in games with flexible information acquisition (i.e., rational inattention, Sims 2003). In games with exogenous information, one can describe the set of attainable outcomes using the Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) concept (Bergemann and Morris 2016). We introduce a refinement of BCE, Blackwell correlated equilibrium (BKE), and prove that it spans all outcomes attainable under some flexible learning technology whose costs increase in Blackwell's (1951,1953) information order. We show the BKE set is either dense or nowhere dense in the BCE set, with the former being true for generic games. We also characterize the set of outcomes attainable under almost-free learning. We conclude by exploring the implications of BKE on a Bertrand competition game, where we show the best BCE for consumers may not be approximable by BKEs.

Econometrics Seminar

Du 21/11/2022 de 16:00 à 17:15

PSE, room R1-13

MUGNIER Martin (CREST, ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris)

Unobserved Clusters of Time-Varying Heterogeneity in Nonlinear Panel Data Models





In studies based on longitudinal data, researchers often assume time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity or linear-in-parameters conditional expectations. Violation of these assumptions may lead to poor counterfactuals. I study the identification and estimation of a large class of nonlinear grouped fixed effects (NGFE) models where the relationship between observed covariates and cross-sectional unobserved heterogeneity is left unrestricted but the latter only takes a restricted number of paths over time. I show that the corresponding clusters and the nonparametrically specified link function can be point-identified when both dimensions of the panel are large. I propose a semiparametric NGFE estimator whose implementation is feasible, and establish its large sample properties in popular binary and count outcome models. Distinctive features of the NGFE estimator are that it is asymptotically normal unbiased at parametric rates, and it allows for the number of periods to grow slowly with the number of cross-sectional units. Monte Carlo simulations suggest good finite sample performance. I apply this new method to revisit the so-called inverted-U relationship between product market competition and innovation. Allowing for clustered patterns of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity leads to a much flatter estimated curve.



Texte intégral

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Du 21/11/2022 de 13:00 à 14:00

Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle 116

ZAPPALà Guglielmo (PSE)

Sectoral impact and propagation of weather shocks





Local weather shocks have been shown to affect local economic output, however, little is known on whether they propagate through production networks. Using a six-sector cross-country dataset over the past fifty years, this paper examines the effect of weather fluctuations and extreme weather events on sectoral economic output and the propagation of weather shocks across sectors, countries and over time. First, I document that agriculture is the most harmed sector by heat shocks, droughts and cyclones. Second, using input-output interlinkages, I find that sectors at later stages of the supply chain suffer from substantial and persistent losses over time due to domestic and foreign heat shocks in other sectors, mostly propagating downstream. Point estimates are economically large, suggesting that indirect losses due to sectoral spillovers are an important component of the total economic impact of climate change. I estimate that, since 2000, the propagation of heat shocks has been responsible for output losses across all sectors and cumulative damages are 33% larger when accounting for spillovers.



Texte intégral

Régulation et Environnement

Du 21/11/2022 de 12:00 à 13:15

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris

BRANCACCIO Giulia (NYU)

Search Frictions and Product Design in the Municipal Bond Market





This paper shows that product design shapes search frictions and that intermediaries leverage this channel to increase their rents in the context of the U.S. municipal bond market. The majority of bonds are designed via negotiations between a local government and its underwriter. They are then traded in a decentralized market, where the underwriter often also acts as an intermediary. Exploiting variations in state regulations that limit government officials’ conflicts of interest, we provide evidence that bond design from the government’s perspective involves a trade-off between flexibility and liquidity, but the underwriter benefits from designing and trading complex bonds. Motivated by these findings, we build and estimate a model of bond origination and trades to quantify market inefficiency driven by underwriters’ role in intermediating trades and discuss policy implications.

Paris Migration Economics Seminar

Du 21/11/2022 de 10:30 à 14:30

Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan

ZAPPALà Guglielmo(PSE)
CINQUE Andrea(CES)
GONNOT Jérôme(CEPII)
LISSONI Francesco(Université de Bordeaux)

Joint seminar with IC Migrations