Calendrier du 21 juin 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 21/06/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
To celebrate more than 1 year of the Junior Economics of Migration Seminar, we are organizing a meet and greet session on Zoom, on June 21st, to have a chance to meet among ourselves, get to know each other, and our research interests! It is open to all scholars interested in migration economics (junior/senior)!
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 21/06/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
ANNULE
NEEMAN Zvika (Tel Aviv University)
Communication with Endogenous Deception Costs
écrit avec Co-author: Ran Eilat
We study how the suspicion that communicated information might be deceptive affects the nature of what can be communicated in a sender-receiver game. Sender is said to deceive Receiver if she sends a message that induces beliefs that are different from those that should have been induced in the realized state. Deception is costly to Sender and the cost is endogenous: it is increasing in the distance between the induced beliefs and the beliefs that should have been induced. A message function that induces Sender to engage in deception is said to be non-credible and cannot be part of an equilibrium. We study credible communication in the frameworks of Crawford & Sobel (1982) and Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011). The cost of deception parametrizes the sender's ability to commit to her strategy. Through varying the cost of deception, we can expand the range of the model from cheap talk, or no commitment, to full commitment.
Texte intégral
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 21/06/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
RENAULT Jérôme (TSE)
Strategic Information transmission with sender’s approval
écrit avec Co-author: Françoise Forges
We consider sender–receiver games in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver makes a decision in a compact set. The new feature is that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject in favor of an outside option. We focus on situations in which the sender’s approval is absolutely crucial to the receiver, namely, on equilibria in which the sender does not exit at the approval stage. We show that if the sender has only two types or if the receiver’s preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender, there exists a (perfect Bayesian Nash) partitional equilibrium without exit, in which the sender transmits information by means of a pure strategy. The previous existence results do not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent utility functions) in which there is no equilibrium without exit, even if the sender can randomize over messages. Communication equilibria without exit always exist in the three type case, and the question is open for 4 or more types.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 21/06/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
RENAULT Jérôme (TSE)
Strategic Information transmission with sender’s approval
écrit avec Co-author: Françoise Forges
We consider sender–receiver games in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver makes a decision in a compact set. The new feature is that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject in favor of an outside option. We focus on situations in which the sender’s approval is absolutely crucial to the receiver, namely, on equilibria in which the sender does not exit at the approval stage. We show that if the sender has only two types or if the receiver’s preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender, there exists a (perfect Bayesian Nash) partitional equilibrium without exit, in which the sender transmits information by means of a pure strategy. The previous existence results do not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent utility functions) in which there is no equilibrium without exit, even if the sender can randomize over messages. Communication equilibria without exit always exist in the three type case, and the question is open for 4 or more types.