Calendrier du 21 septembre 2020
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 21/09/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
online
CHASSANG Sylvain (Princeton)
Making the Most of Limited Government Capacity
écrit avec Lucia Del Carpio (INSEAD), Sam Kapon (NYU)
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 21/09/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/93616552456?pwd=RUFic0gzT2lGSnl2QWNtbmUrcEE5dz09
PATAULT Bérengère (CREST/Ecole Polytechnique)
How valuable are business networks? Evidence from salesmen in international markets
écrit avec Clémence Lenoir (INSEE)
How to gain new buyers and expand one’s business? This paper provides a very simple an- swer to this question: by hiring salesmen. Combining French firm-to-firm trade data with a detailed occupational dataset, we offer new empirical evidence that salesmen play a role for the construction of a firm’s portfolio of foreign buyers. We then characterize a specific channel explaining such a role: using an event-study design, we show that a poached salesman brings on average 0.14 buyers of her former firm’s buyers to her new firm. Additional results indicate that country and sectoral knowledge can only explain a small fraction of this effect, which suggests that salesmen accumulate buyer-specific knowledge when working for exporting firms, knowl- edge that they transmit when poached. Finally, we quantify, building on a simple theoretical framework, the importance of business network transmission to understand salesmen’s role in buyer acquisition. We find that, on average for a salesman, having interacted with a buyer in the past multiplies the probability to sell to this buyer in the future by 9 times.
Texte intégral
Régulation et Environnement
Du 21/09/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
online
HARSTAD Bard (University of Oslo)
THE CONSERVATION MULTIPLIER
Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether toexploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whetherto exploit or conserve. This paper develops a model of this situation and showswhen a small probability that some future government will exploit has a multipliere§ect on earlier decisions. The multiplier can be taken advantage of by a lobbypaying for exploitation, or by a donor compensating for conservation. The analysisalso uncovers when compensations are optimally o§ered to the president, the partyin power, the general public, or to the lobby group.