Calendrier du 22 octobre 2024
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 22/10/2024 de 17:30 à 18:30
BARTOLINI Luciana(University of Trieste)
BOB Rijkers(PSE)
Environmental fiscal policy and optimal labour allocation
1) Within an OLG framework, we assume agents are endowed with green preferences that can modify consumption choices. We present a bi-sectoral model that clearly shows the negative and positive externalities on the en- vironment caused by the brown and green sectors. The laissez-faire model is clearly sub-optimal. It allows for larger production and pollution with- out taking into account future generations. We introduce a social planner that demonstrably increases total welfare by accounting for both present and future generations thanks to the social discount factor. We prove that the government can decentralise the social optimum by effectively managing fiscal policy instruments. Indeed, the introduction of govern- ment bonds crowds out investment in physical capital, slowing thus down production and preserving the environment. To illustrate our findings, we have also performed a series of simulations.
2) It is well established that demand can change the direction of product innovation in standard markets. But does this also work in a setting with large negative externalities? Can socially responsible consumers induce Pigouvian innovation by demanding new products that are less harmful to, e.g., the climate, biodiversity, or animal welfare? I propose an empirical test using two decades of US retail scanner data. Identification is based on a shift-share design that exploits exogenous changes in the relative size of different consumer groups.
Du 22/10/2024 de 17:30 à 18:30
Within an OLG framework, we assume agents are endowed with green preferences that can modify consumption choices. We present a bi-sectoral model that clearly shows the negative and positive externalities on the en- vironment caused by the brown and green sectors. The laissez-faire model is clearly sub-optimal. It allows for larger production and pollution with- out taking into account future generations. We introduce a social planner that demonstrably increases total welfare by accounting for both present and future generations thanks to the social discount factor. We prove that the government can decentralise the social optimum by effectively managing fiscal policy instruments. Indeed, the introduction of govern- ment bonds crowds out investment in physical capital, slowing thus down production and preserving the environment. To illustrate our findings, we have also performed a series of simulations.
Virtual Development Economics Seminar
Du 22/10/2024 de 16:00 à 17:00
Zoom
ALMåS Ingvild (Monash University)
*
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 22/10/2024 de 14:30 à 16:00
Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris (M° Saint Germain des Prés), salle H401 / Jean-Paul Fitoussi
MRAZOVA Monika (U. Geneva)
*
STEP (Seminar of Trade Economists in Paris)
Du 22/10/2024 de 13:00 à 14:00
Science Po
LAFROGNE-JOUSSIER Raphael (CREST-Ecole Polytechnique)
*
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 22/10/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
LO CONTE Giacomo ()
Localized innovation effects on German Labor Markets
The role and effects of innovation on wage distributions have been widely studied at the regional level, but its sectoral dynamics have received far less attention. In this study, we address this gap by combining a large administrative panel dataset of the German labor market with patent data from PatStat to examine the causal impact of innovation on labor market outcomes at the local-sectoral level from 2005 to 2019. Our findings show that more innovative sectors not only offer higher wages but also exhibit lower wage dispersion and smaller increases in wage inequality. This can be attributed primarily to the differing composition of the workforce in these sectors, with a higher proportion of workers benefiting significantly from innovation. Finally, despite the overall positive impact on wage distribution, we observe that the benefits of innovation are not shared equally among all workers.