Calendrier du 22 mars 2018
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 22/03/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-13
JAIMOVICH Nir (University of Zurich) *;
La séance est annulée
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 22/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
ELLISON Sara (MIT)
Dynamics of the Gender Gap in High Math Achievement
écrit avec Co-author: Ashley Swanson
This paper examines the dynamics of the gender gap in high math achievement over the high school years using data from the American Mathematics Competition. A clear gender gap is already present by 9th grade and the gender gap widens over the high school years. High-achieving students must substantially improve their performance from year to year to maintain their within-cohort rank, but there is nonetheless a great deal of persistence in the rankings. Several gender-related differences in the dynamics contribute to the widening of the gender gap, including differences in dropout rates and in the mean and variance of year-to-year improvements among continuing students. A decomposition indicates that the most important difference is that fewer girls make large enough gains to move up substantially in the rankings. An analysis of students on the margin of qualifying for a prestigious second stage exam provides evidence of a discouragement effect: some react to falling just short by dropping out of participating in future years, and this reaction is more common among girls.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 22/03/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BAUMANN Léonie (University of Cambridge )
Identifying the best agent in a network.
This paper develops a mechanism for a principal to allocate a prize to the most valued agent when agents have a knowledge network. The principal does not know any agent's value but any two linked agents know each other's values. Agents compete for the prize and send costless private messages about their own value and the values of others they know to the principal. Agents can lie only to a certain extent and only lie if it increases their chances of winning the prize. A mechanism that determines each agent's chances of winning for any possible message profile is proposed. We show that with this mechanism, there exists an equilibrium such that the most valued agent wins with certainty if every agent has at least one link; if the network is a star or complete, then the most valued agent wins with certainty in every equilibrium.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 22/03/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R1-15, campus Jourdan - 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
DO Quy-Toan (The World Bank)
The Price Elasticity of African Elephant Poaching
écrit avec Andrei A. Levchenko, Lin Ma, Julian Blanc, Holly Dublin, and Tom Milliken.