Calendrier du 22 mars 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 22/03/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
SANTAMARIA Julieth (University of Minnesota)
When a Stranger Shall Sojourn with Thee’: The Impact of the Venezuelan Exodus on Colombian Labor Markets
This paper analyzes the effect of open-door immigration policies on local labor markets. Using the sharp and unprecedented surge of Venezuelan refugees into Colombia, I study the impact on wages and employment in a context where work permits were granted at scale. To identify which labor markets immigrants are entering, I overcome limitations in official records and generate novel evidence of refugee settlement patterns by tracking the geographical distribution of Internet search terms that Venezuelans but not Colombians use. While official records suggest migrants are concentrated in a few cities, the Internet search index shows migrants are located across the country. Using this index, high-frequency labor market data, and a difference-in-differences design, I find precise null effects on employment and wages in the formal and informal sectors. A machine learning approach that compares counterfactual cities with locations most impacted by immigration yields similar results. All in all, the results suggest that open-door policies do not harm labor markets in the host community.
Texte intégral
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 22/03/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
ALI Nageeb (Penn State)
Reselling Information
Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others.
We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that
even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents
from at most a single buyer: her payoffs converge to 0 as soon as a single buyer has
bought information. By contrast, if the seller can also sell valueless tokens, there
exists a “prepay equilibrium” where payment is extracted from all buyers before the
information good is released. By exploiting resale possibilities, this prepay equilibrium
gives the seller as high a payoff as she would achieve if resale were prohibited.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 22/03/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/94445869097?pwd=WVgweGJiUStZV0phaW54TGlueEhxUT09
STIPANICIC Fernando (TSE)
The Diffusion of Knowledge: Evidence from the Jet Age
écrit avec Stefan Pauly (Sciences Po)
This paper studies the impact of travel time on the diffusion of knowledge. We provide causal evidence by exploiting the beginning of the Jet Age as a quasi-natural experiment. We digitize airlines' historical flight schedules and construct a novel data set of the flight network in the United States. Between 1951 and 1966, average travel time between locations more than 2,000km away decreased 49%. We use patent citations as a measure of knowledge diffusion. For research establishments located more than 2,000km away from each other, the reduction in travel time increased citations by 8.1%. The reduction in travel time accounts for more than one third of the observed increase in citations in this distance interval. Additionally, the reduction in travel time increased the diffusion of knowledge through multi-establishment firms. Firms opened research establishments in locations that obtained a relative reduction in travel time to headquarters. Firms carried knowledge across distant establishments and increased its diffusion.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 22/03/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
HEIDHUES Paul (University of Dusseldorf)
Procrastination Markets
We develop models of markets with procrastinating consumers when competition operates — or is supposed to operate — both through the initial selection of providers and through the possibility of switching providers. As in other work, consumers fail to switch to better options after signing up with a firm, so at that stage they exert little downward pressure on the prices they pay. Unlike in other work, however, consumers — falsely expecting to do still better in the future — are not keen on starting with the best available offer, so at this stage they do not generate much price competition either. In fact, a competition paradox results: an increase in the number of firms or the intensity of marketing increases the frequency with which a consumer receives switching offers, so it facilitates procrastination and thereby potentially raises prices. By implication, continuous changes in the environment can, through a self-reinforcing entry or marketing process, lead to discontinuous changes in market outcomes. Sign-up deals serve their classically hypothesized role of returning ex-post profits to consumers extremely poorly, while in other senses they exacerbate the failure of price competition.