Calendrier du 22 juin 2020
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 22/06/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/98159672731?pwd=ZitmQm5qekg4dWZub0pudWdoQXo0QT09
FIZE Etienne (CAE)
Macroeconomic imbalances and the rise of protectionism
écrit avec Samuel Delpeuch (SciencesPo) and Philippe Martin (CEPR, SciencesPo, CAE)
We analyze the macroeconomic determinants of the rise of protectionism in the past 10 years focusing on bilateral trade imbalances. If politicians launch protectionist attacks based on expected net employment gains then the bilateral trade balance is an approximate measure predicting which countries will be attacked. The reason is that it balances the gains from protecting employment from foreign imports and losses from retaliation on exports. We show empirically that bilateral trade imbalances are robust predictors of protectionist attacks based on the Global Trade Alert database. Retaliation to past attacks, the bilateral exchange rate and current account imbalances are also good predictors of protectionist attacks.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 22/06/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
online
MELINDI-GHIDI Paolo (Université de Nanterre)
Particularism, dominant minorities and institutional change
écrit avec Raouf Boucekkine, Rodolphe Desbordes
We develop a theory of institutional transition from dictatorship to minority dominant-based regimes in resource-dependent economies. We depart from the standard political transition framework à la Acemoglu-Robinson in four essential ways: (i) population is heterogeneous, there is a minority/majority split, heterogeneity being generic, simply reflecting subgroup size; (ii) there is no median voter in the post-dictatorship period, political and economic competition is favorable to the minority (fiscal particularism); (iii) (windfall) natural resources are introduced, and (iv) we distinguish between labor income and resources, and labor supply is endogenous. We first document empirically fiscal particularism, its connection with natural resource endowment, and the impact of both on revolutionary bursts. Second, we construct a full-fledged model incorporating the four characteristics outlined above. We show, among others, that polarization is a sufficient condition for revolutions, while natural resource rents are not although they do matter when polarization is low. In agreement with our empirical facts, countries engaging in revolutions tend to be slightly less resource-rich than other countries. We also outline the interplay between natural resource rents, polarization and labor market conditions at the dawn of institutional change. Our theory is appropriate to understand the institutional dynamics of highly homogeneous resource-rich countries which, after a post-independence autocratic regime, turn to be dominated by minorities.