Calendrier du 23 avril 2020
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 23/04/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - using ZOOM
BRAUN Thomas (Columbia)
Revisiting Unemployment with an Intensive Margin - Using ZOOM
The unemployment rate is the most used single indicator of labor market conditions, but its measure is black and white, lacking any notion of intensity. This paper introduces a continuous unemployment rate; a measure in which people are weighted by their relative search effort. The measure of relative search effort is a monthly probability of exerting search effort, estimated from the American Time Use Survey. The paper delivers a continuous unemployment rate, as well as adjusted labor market flows, for the United States from 1980 onward. On average, the continuous unemployment rate is 4.8 percentage points higher than the standard unemployment rate and recovers slower after every recession since 1990. While the standard unemployment rate has a downward trend over time, the continuous unemployment rate does not, suggesting no decrease in the natural rate of unemployment. Further, the continuous unemployment rate accounts for more of the variation in nominal wages than standard unemployment rate or unemployment gap.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 23/04/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
MUN Soffia (PSE)
ANNULE
Behavior seminar
Du 23/04/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
PRATI Alberto (University College London)
ZOOM. Time preferences for duration
écrit avec Maria Bigoni, Stéphane Luchini
Economic models typically assume agents to positively discount their future utility, that is, to enjoy sooner benefits more than later ones. A growing empirical literature has documented systematic violations of positive discounting for some non-monetary items. Yet, the reason for such violations is unclear. A key role might be played by the degree of temporal fungibility, intended as the extent to which a good can or cannot be saved for a later period. Herein, we report a longitudinal laboratory experiment where we study time preferences for a good with high market fungibility but no temporal fungibility: time spent in the laboratory. Subjects are asked to allocate money (control) and free time (treatment) over two future periods. We design a novel allocation environment which allows to disentangle discounting and convexity properties of the utility function. We find that, ceteris paribus, people prefer to allocate more money to the sooner than the later period, but more free time to the later than the sooner period. Personal timetables and heterogeneous preferences cannot solely explain this asymmetry. Our results suggest that positive discounting can lead to non-negligible predictive errors in many relevant domains, such as health, education and labor. They also invite to reconsider the interpretation of the discount factor in monetary decisions.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 23/04/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
PSE- Using ZOOM
BRYSON Alex (University College London)
Are Women Doing It For Themselves? Female Managers and the Gender Wage Gap
écrit avec Nikolaos Theodoropoulos (University of Cyprus) and John Forth (City University of London).
Using matched employer-employee data for Britain from the 2004 and 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS), we find a raw gender wage gap in hourly wages of around 0.18-0.21 log points. The regression-adjusted gap is around half that. However, the gender wage gap declines substantially with an increasing share of female managers in the workplace. The gap is no longer statistically significant when around 90 percent of workplace managers are women, a scenario that obtains in around one in ten workplaces. The gap closes because women's wages rise with the share of female managers in the workplace while men's wages fall. Instrumental variables estimates suggest the share of female managers in the workplace has a causal impact in reducing the gender wage gap. The role of female managers in closing the gender wage gap is more pronounced when employees are paid for performance, consistent with the proposition that women are more likely to be paid equitably when managers have discretion in the way they reward performance and those managers are women. These findings suggest a stronger presence of women in managerial positions can help tackle the gender wage gap.
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