Calendrier du 23 septembre 2019
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 23/09/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
HE Yinghua (Rice U)
Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice with Lotteries
écrit avec Yeon-Koo Che, Dong Woo Hahm
Recent evidence suggests that market participants make mistakes (even) in a strategically straightforward environment but seldom with significant payoff consequences. Uncertainties arising from the use of lotteries or other sources increase payoff consequences of certain mistakes, and force participants to take care to avoid them. Consequently, uncertainties limit the extent to which certain mistakes are made, thus making it possible for one to infer some preference relations reliably. We propose a novel method of exploiting the uncertainties present in a matching environment to systematically and robustly infer student preferences over schools based on their rank-order lists data. Our method consists of three steps: (i) simulating the underlying structure of uncertainties present in the environment, (ii) extracting preference relations revealed under the simulated uncertainties, and then (iii) extending the revealed preference relations via the axiom of transitivity. Depending on the type of uncertainties present, the method rationalizes a variety of procedures, ranging from truthful-reporting assumption at one extreme (full-support uncertainty) to the stability assumption at the other extreme (when there is little uncertainty). Further, we refine our method to strengthen the robustness of the revealed preferences in the presence of participants making even some payoff-relevant mistakes, and explore ways to optimally balance the tradeoff between robustness and efficiency in preference estimation. We apply our methods to estimate student preferences through a Monte Carlo analysis capturing canonical school choice environment with single tie-breaking lotteries. Finally, we apply our methods as well as other existing methods to New York City high school assignment data to explore their implications for preference estimation and counterfactual analysis under a possible policy intervention.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 23/09/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
SCHÜTZ Rafael ()
All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices
écrit avec Joao Montez
We study production-in-advance in a setting where firms first source inventories that remain unobservable to rivals, and then simultaneously set prices. In the unique equilibrium, each firm occasionally holds a sale relative to its reference price, resulting in firms sometimes being left with unsold inventory. In the limit as inventory costs become fully recoverable, the equilibrium converges to an equilibrium of the game where firms only choose prices and produce to order - the associated Bertrand game (examples of such games include fully-asymmetric clearinghouse models). Thus, away from that limit, our work generalizes Bertrand-type equilibria to production in advance, and challenges the commonly-held view associating production in advance with Cournot outcomes. The analysis involves, as an intermediate step, mapping the price-inventory game into an asymmetric all-pay contest with outside options and non-monotonic winning and losing functions. We lay out applications to taxation, merger analysis, information sharing, ex-ante investments, and vertical relations.
Texte intégral