Calendrier du 24 février 2020
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 24/02/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
SMOLIN Alex (TSE)
Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes
A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be
one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller
can disclose to the buyer arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical
experiment. The seller decides how to price the object, what information to disclose,
and how to price access to the information. To screen different types, the seller offers
a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices.
I characterize revenue-maximizing menus. If all types value the same attribute, then
the seller cannot benefit from information disclosure and price discrimination. More
generally, if each type values a single attribute and attributes are independent, then
the seller can benefit from information disclosure but not from price discrimination.
In other cases, a discriminatory menu can be profitable; however, optimal experiments
always belong to a tractable class of linear disclosure policies. The analysis informs
the operation of various intermediaries including business brokers and online recruiting
platforms.
Texte intégral
Régulation et Environnement
Du 24/02/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
ORSET Caroline (AgroParisTech)
Innovation, information, lobby and tort law under uncertainty
écrit avec Julien Jacob (Université de Strasbourg, BETA)
Recent environmental policies favor the 'pollutant-payer' Principle. This Principle points out the pollutant financial liability for eventual incident induced by its activities. Investing in technological innovations generates uncertainty on the future returns, as well as on the damages that such innovations could involve and on the cost to pay in case of troubles. To reduce this uncertainty, the firm has the opportunity to acquire information, for example through research activities, on its project's potential consequences on human health and on the environment. However, in their efforts to obtain and/or to maintain a marketing authorization with the Regulator affairs, firms may develop specific strategies to exploit scientific uncertainty. They may produce favorable scientific findings. In case of accident, the firm having this type of behavior can be legally charged. We then analyze whether liability rules and tort law incentive the firm both to invest in research and development in order to reduce the uncertainty and to decrease miscommunication on the results. We find that the firm's decision to stop or continue to sell its product depends on the levels of precision of the exogenous and of the endogenous information she receives, and on the ratio between marginal benefit and damages from maintaining the product in the future. We then understand that the firm's decision to adopt a lobby behavior depends on its expected payoff, its level of research, and its belief being sentenced when she has chosen to adopt a lobby behavior. Finally, we clarify the effect of the penal liability on the firm's investment in research decision. The level of the fine pushes the firm to reduce its uncertainty about the risk of accident. However, if she perceives that the risk of accident is high, its investment in research will decrease with the level of the fine for maintaining its expected payoff.