Calendrier du 24 mars 2022
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 24/03/2022 de 16:00 à 17:15
Using Zoom
SCHMITT-GROHE Stéphanie(Columbia)
EDOUARD SCHAAL AND Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel()
Optimal Bank Reserve Remuneration and Capital Control Policy
écrit avec Chun-Che Chi and Martin Uribe
A central prediction of open economy models with a pecuniary externality due to a collateral constraint is that the unregulated economy overborrows relative to what occurs under optimal capital controls. A maintained assumption in this literature is that households borrow directly from foreign lenders. This paper shows that in a more realistic setting in which foreign lending to households is intermediated by domestic banks and in which the government has access to capital controls and interest on bank reserves, the unregulated economy underborrows. Under optimal policy, the central bank injects reserves during recessions. In this way, when the collateral constraint binds, the central bank uncouples household deleveraging from economy-wide delever- aging, which results in a higher average level of external debt. The paper documents that during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis the lending spread in emerging and developed economies displayed a muted response. This fact is consistent with a decline in the demand rather than in the supply of loans and gives credence to models in which the collateral constraint is placed at the level of the nonfinancial sector as opposed to at the level of the bank.
Texte intégral
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 24/03/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
GOEDDE Julius (PSE)
The long run impact of childhood interracial contact on residential segregation
écrit avec LUCA PAOLO MERLINO and MAX FRIEDRICH STEINHARDT
This paper investigates whether interracial contact in childhood impacts residential choices in adulthood. We exploit quasi-random variation in the share of black students across cohorts within US schools. We find that more
black peers of the same gender in a grade induces whites to live in blacker census tracts more than 20 years after exposure. We do not find any effect on labor market outcomes or other neighborhood characteristics, suggesting the most likely mechanism is a change in preferences of respondents
Behavior seminar
Du 24/03/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online and Room R2.01, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
NAGEL Rosemarie (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE, Spain)
Integrating Level-k, Efficiency Heuristics, and a Behavioral Taxonomy for 2x2 Games
The outcomes from strategic decision-making (such as market entry or technology adoption) depend on structural features of situations and types of players involved. Even in identical situations, players differ in their perceptions of situations, goals, and strategic sophistication. Informed by behavioral and experimental economics, we present and integrate two classes of heuristic player types under strategic uncertainty in new situations, exemplified within the simplest class of games, two players–two actions (2x2) games, e.g., Prisoner's dilemma or Entry games. One class anticipates others' behavior and (iteratedly) best-replies to beliefs (called iterated reasoning or level-k heuristic), while the other is guided by goals, e.g., equality or social optimum, ignoring procedural details, such as others'reasoning (called efficiency heuristic). To understand the implications of game structure and player types, we develop a behavioral system of 2x2 games. Due to the fundamental differences of the two classes, the large set of 2x2 games collapses to four distinct game classes for efficiency types and five, albeit different ones, for iterated reasoning, and to 14 in a joint system based on (behavioral) gametheoretic features. Thus, advanced knowledge of players' strategic capabilities or goals considerably simplifies the strategic analysis by inducing a categorization of games. Furthermore, we predict differences in the heterogeneity of behavior and outcomes, depending on the presence of different player types and game structure.