Calendrier du 24 avril 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 24/04/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SEIDMANN Daniel (University of Nottingham)
The first and last word in debates: plaintive plaintiffs
écrit avec Elena D’Agostino
Abstract: Plaintiffs/prosecutors present their evidence before defendants in common law trials. We analyze a model of trials with the following properties. If litigants share available evidence then they never prefer to present first, but may prefer to present second. However, litigants may otherwise prefer to present first because doing so replicates the follower's ex ante optimal commitment. If litigants share available evidence then a litigant cannot prefer the option to choose the order after observing its available evidence over always presenting second; and may prefer to always present second over having the option to choose the order.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 24/04/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle S/19, MSE, 106 boulevard de l'hôpital, 75013 Paris
OURENS Guzman (FNRS and IRES -Université catholique de Louvain)
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Régulation et Environnement
Du 24/04/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
TOEWS Gerhard(New Economic School)
ALTAGHLIBI Moutaz(PSE, Paris I, Dynamic Border Carbon Adjustment to Enhance Green Growth)
Creative Destruction vs Destructive Destruction: A Schumpeterian Approach for Environmental Policy
This article aims to show how a market exposed to catastrophic events finds the equilibrium level of adaptation and mitigation policies through R&D policy, with respect to different levels of Poisson probability of catastrophe. We study the effect of a pollution tax on the long-run growth rate and the implications of catastrophe probability on this effect. Our results suggest that the economy increases its R&D level with a higher catastrophe probability only if the penalty rate due to an abrupt event is sufficiently high. We also show that a pollution tax could increase the long-run growth. Besides, the catastrophe probability increases the amplitude of this positive effect if penalty rate is high enough. The market makes adaptation much more than mitigation with a higher catastrophe probability if total productivity of R&D is higher than cleanliness of innovations for intermediate goods. Lastly, we show that pollution growth could be higher with less polluting inputs, which we call a Jevons-type paradox.
Abstract :
This paper analyzes the growth and welfare impacts of Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA) across trading countries. I build a trade model with monopolistic competition and dynamic investment decisions using Ramsey growth model. The government in each country can invest either in green nonpolluting or in brown polluting capital. I solve numerically for an open loop Nash equilibrium to study different configurations of BCAs across countries. I find that a unilateral BCA is welfare enhancing for the country that applies it and an effective tool to shift the growth of the other country towards greener path even when countries are not concerned about the environment. In a case of a BCA war, results show that a bilateral BCA becomes welfare enhancing for both countries if governments care sufficiently about the environmental quality of their consumers. Moreover, the asymmetry in initial development levels across countries induces a slower growth for the initially poorer country only if the other country is richer in brown capital. Furthermore, the model shows that trade openness should be done gradually along the development path of countries.