Calendrier du 24 septembre 2018
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 24/09/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
BOGOMOLNAIA Anna (University of Glasgow)
Fair Division of random objects
écrit avec H Moulin, F Sandomirskyi
Fair Division of random objects
A Bogomolnaia, H Moulin, F Sandomirskyi
Objects arrive randomly, and must be allocated on the spot between a ?xed
set of bene?ciaries. We explore the tradeo¤ between the concerns for Fairness
and the utilitarian measure of E¢ ciency:
Fair Share guarantees to each agent, in expectation and in each period,
at least 1/n-th of the value to him of the goods (or at most 1/n-th of the
disutility of the bads);
E¢ ciency assigns goods to those who value them most (or bads to those
who dislike them least).
Even a Bayesian manager (who knows in each period the full probability
distribution of utility pro?les) faces a steep (and well known) Price of Fairness:
in the worst case implementing Fair Share allows her to capture only a O( 1 pn)
fraction of the e¢ cient surplus.
A Prior-free manager who only knows the expectation of individual utilities
in each period (or just the ratios of these expectations), but neither the actual
distribution in any period, nor the number of periods, ensures Fair Share by the
simple Proportional rule: agents get the object with probabilities proportional
to their (normalized) utilities (or disutilities).
We de?ne the equally simple one-dimensional family of Top Heavy rules and
show that they capture the optimal tradeo¤s between fairness and e¢ ciency:
any other prior-free rule meeting Fair Share is less e¢ cient ex post (for every
realization of utilities) than one of our rules. In particular the Proportional rule
is substantially less e¢ cient than one of our rules. Moreover the Top Heavy
rules pay the same Price of Fairness as the best Bayesian rules.
1
Development Economics Seminar
Du 24/09/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
AKRESH Richard (University of Illinois )
Long-term and Intergenerational Effects of Education: Evidence from School Construction in Indonesia
écrit avec with Daniel Halim and Marieke Kleemans
In 1973, the Indonesian government began one of the largest school construction programs ever. We use 2016 nationally representative data to examine the long-term and intergenerational effects of additional schooling as a child. We use a difference-in-differences identification strategy exploiting variation across birth cohorts and regions in the number of schools built. Men and women exposed to the program attain more education, although women’s effects are concentrated in primary school. As adults, men who received more education are more likely to be formal workers and work in a non-agricultural sector. Households in which either parent received more education have higher consumption, more assets, and pay more government taxes. These education benefits are transmitted to the next generation. Increased parental education has larger impacts for daughters, particularly if the mother was exposed to the school construction program. Migration and marriage are potential mechanisms linking additional education and improved long-term outcomes.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 24/09/2018 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
MARTIMORT David (PjSE)
Screening Contracts As A Barrier To Entry
écrit avec Jérôme Pouyet and Lars Stole
We uncover how strategic and screening concerns interact in the design of ver-
tical contracts under the threat of entry. We provide a rationale for the use of
rebates, discounts and quantity requirements in a context with uncertainty on the
fixed cost of entry, multi-unit demand and private information on the buyer’s prefer-
ences. These key ingredients were missing from the extant literature. First, private
information on the buyer’s tastes motivates the use of price discounts as screening
devices as in any nonlinear pricing context. Yet, price discounts are modified by
the threat of entry in subtle ways that depend on the contractual environments.
Second, the buyer has a downward sloping demand and finds it sometimes optimal
to split consumption between the incumbent and the entrant, with the proviso, con-
sistent with most recent Antitrust cases, that the entrant, although more efficient,
never serves the whole demand. Third, although it can be attractive on alloca-
tive grounds, entry might not always be socially optimal because of uncertainty
on the fixed cost of entry. We study two different scenarios. In the first one, the
case of market-share contracts, the incumbent can design different nonlinear tariffs
depending on whether the buyer also purchases from the entrant or not. In the
second scenario, the incumbent can only offer a single nonlinear tariff and cannot
distinguish whether the buyer also purchases from the entrant or not. Our analy-
sis stresses properties of nonlinear prices that are specific to an entry context and
that respond to the incumbent’s incentives to shift rent under the aforementioned
contractual restrictions.