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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 25 novembre 2019

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 25/11/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30

salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

ASHLAGI Itai (Stanford University)

Improving efficiency in kidney exchange



écrit avec Market Failure in Kidney Exchange, with Nikhil Agarwal, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton Featherstong, Omer Karduman and Scrip Systems with Minimal Availability, with Suleyman Kerimov (in progress)




We find that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30%-63%. We document that the market is fragmented and inefficient: most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. We propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patients' benefits from exchange, and current platforms sub-optimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. We propose a scrip system to eliminate free-riding of hospitals, which will eliminate some of the inefficiency in the market. To understand how a scrip system will behave in practice, we study a stylized dynamic “exchanging favors” model that captures special features of kidney exchange. Each period one agent requests service, one agent provides service, and the service requester pays a scrip to the service provider. We analyze the scrip distribution under the assumption that, for each service request, only few agents are able to provide the requested service. We identify conditions, under which the scrip distribution is stable in the sense that agents do not deviate much from their initial endowment with high probability. The results hint that scrip systems will result in better outcomes for kidney exchange platforms, where free riding is ubiquitous.



Texte intégral

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Du 25/11/2019 de 13:00 à 14:00

MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle 116) 75013 Paris

REVERDY Camille (University of Paris 1 )

Estimating the General Equilibrium Effects of Services Trade Liberalization





The intangible nature of services and the lack of disaggregated trade data enlarge the difficulties involved in assessing impediments to cross-border trade in services. In an attempt to reduce the information gap existing in services trade, this paper estimates the conditional and general equilibrium responses to the liberalization of services trade, using a three step estimation method relying on structural gravity model. Focusing on eight services sectors: construction, land transport, maritime transport, air transport, logistics services, telecommunication services, financial services and professional services, I find that the removal of restrictive policy measures applied by the importing country would lead to welfare gains between $10%$ and $31%$. The largest welfare improvements are found for the sector `Air Transport', the most restrictive sector on average, and for the smallest trading countries.

Régulation et Environnement

Du 25/11/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00

salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris

DAUBANES Julien (University of Geneva (GSEM) and MIT (CEEPR))

Green finance and climate policy



écrit avec Jean-Charles-Rochet: University of Geneva (SFI, GSEM) and MIT (Sloan)




A rapidly increasing amount of investments commit firms to undertake climate-friendly projects. Recent empirical evidence shows that certified green bonds have a significant impact on CO2 emissions. Yet little is known about the economic mechanisms of green finance and its possible contribution to climate policy. This paper develops the first formal analysis of green finance as a climate policy instrument. We examine firms that undertake green and conventional projects, and finance the former through green bonds. Green projects emit less CO2, but they entail costs which stock investors do not directly observe. Our theory holds that green bonds allow firms to signal to stock investors their otherwise unobservable efficiency at controlling their CO2 emissions. Our model consistently accounts for stylized facts on the recent development of green finance. It explains why firms benefit from green bonds even though these bonds' yield spread is small in practice compared to conventional bonds. The analysis has direct implications for the effective design of climate policy. Like carbon taxation, green finance induces firms to undertake more green projects at the expense of conventional ones. It may further amplify the effect of carbon taxation. Moreover, unlike standard voluntary programs, green finance induces firms to abandon their least efficient conventional projects.

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Du 25/11/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00

Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème

PREDTETCHINSKI Arkadi ()

Arkadi PREDTETCHINSKI