Calendrier du 25 mars 2024
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 25/03/2024 de 17:00 à 18:30
R1-09
LAOHAKUNAKORN Krittanai (University of Surrey)
Monopoly pricing with optimal information
écrit avec Guilherme Carmona
We analyze a monopoly pricing model where information about the buyer's valuation is endogenous. Before the seller sets a price, both the buyer and seller receive private signals that may be informative about the buyer's valuation. The joint distribution of these signals, as a function of the valuation, is optimally chosen by the players. In general, players have conflicting incentives over the provision of information. As a modelling device, we assume that an aggregation function determines the information structure from the choices of the players. We characterize the payoffs and prices that can arise in equilibrium for a natural class of aggregation functions. When both players are initially uninformed, equilibrium prices do not depend on the buyer's valuation. In contrast, if the buyer initially knows her own valuation, the price in every equilibrium is always equal to either the buyer's valuation or the uniform monopoly price
Régulation et Environnement
Du 25/03/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30
R1-15
MISSIRIAN Anouch (TSE)
*Can Demand-Side Interventions Rebuild Global Fisheries?
Despite recent improvements in the ecological status of wild-capture fisheries, a significant share (33%) of global marine stocks remains overexploited. While top-down management has been shown to work in many settings, there is growing interest in demand-side interventions, which work through consumer-originated price signals to incentivize reduced fishing pressure. The effectiveness of demand-side interventions would rely, in part, on a large enough supply elasticity of fisheries, though this crucial statistic is notoriously difficult to estimate and remains elusive in the literature. Using plausibly exogenous variation in fish prices and extensive data on the world's fisheries, we derive an empirical approach to estimate this elasticity using an instrumental variables estimator. We find it is very low -- similar to that observed in comparable sectors. This suggests that even if prices did respond to demand-side interventions, the supply response would be small. To determine whether the ensuing supply response would have meaningful ecological consequences, we combine a bioeconomic model of fisheries with a global model of supply and demand for seafood calibrated with our estimates. We find that even interventions that lead to dramatic demand shifts are unlikely to achieve more than marginal improvements to fisheries status. In contrast, we find that supply-side policies (such as well-enforced fishing quotas), even imperfectly designed or implemented, can result in substantial recovery.