Calendrier du 26 septembre 2024
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 26/09/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
GEUNA Pietro (PSE)
Political Consequences of Adverse Labor Market Shocks.
It is commonly argued that adverse labor market shocks, e.g. mass layoffs, fuel political discontent and/or disengagement. However, few papers try to establish how mass layoffs causally impact political activity. We use high-frequency data on contributions to US political parties and self-reported data on mass layoffs in the last decade in the United States to try to address this gap. We find evidence against the hypothesis that mass layoffs lead to disengagement; on the contrary, we find an increase in political activity in the months following a large event. We propose that these findings can be explained by a desire to punish the incumbent politician for the perceived mismanagement of the economy.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 26/09/2024 de 12:30 à 13:45
R2-01
DESMET Klaus (SMU)
Latent Polarization
écrit avec Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín and Romain Wacziarg
We develop a new method to endogenously partition society
into groups based on homophily in values. The between-group
differentiation that results from this partition provides a novel
measure of latent polarization in society. For the last forty years,
the degree of latent polarization of the U.S. public has been high and
relatively stable. In contrast, the degree of partisan polarization
between voters of the two main political parties steadily increased
since the 1990s, and is now converging toward that of underlying
values-based clusters. Growing partisan polarization in the U.S. is a
reflection of partisan views becoming increasingly aligned with the
main values-based clusters in society.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 26/09/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-14
GHERSENGORIN Alexis (Oxford)
Robust regulation and flexibility in labour markets
We study the robust regulation of labour contracts in the canonical moral hazard
problem with limited liability. When offering a contract, the principal trades off sur-
plus creation – i.e., incentivising a more productive action – and surplus extraction –
i.e., minimizing the incentive rent paid to the agent. A regulator may therefore inter-
vene and restrict the set of permissible contracts to (i) restore efficiency and (ii) protect
the worker. When the regulator does not know the details of the production environ-
ment, we show that imposing a minimum wage minimizes her worst-case regret. The
optimal regulation allows all contracts that exceed a linear one. The slope of the min-
imal wage balances the worker’s protection (by guaranteeing a minimal share of the
production) and the necessary flexibility for incentives provision