Calendrier du 27 novembre 2019
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 27/11/2019 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
ARTOLA BLANCO Miguel (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid)
Household asset returns and portfolio composition: Spain, 1900-2017
Development Economics Seminar
Du 27/11/2019 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
DUPAS Pascaline ()
The Incidence of Public Subsidies to Private Hospitals under Weak Governance: Evidence from India
écrit avec with Radhika Jain
Expanding public health insurance and enlisting private agents for service delivery are common policy strategies to meet the goals of universal health coverage, but there is limited evidence from developing countries to inform their design. This paper provides quantitative evidence on how insurance design affects program performance and incidence in the context of a government-funded health insurance program that aims to provide free care to 46 million people in Rajasthan, India. We exploit a policy-induced natural experiment, and use administrative claims linked to patient surveys, to provide the first large-scale evidence of private hospital behavior under public health insurance.
Economic History Seminar
Du 27/11/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
CHAMBRU Cedric (Dept. of Economics, University of Zürich)
Do it Right! Leaders, Weather Shocks and Social Conflicts in Pre-Industrial France (1661-1789)
I use spatial and temporal variation in temperature shocks to examine the effect of adverse weather conditions on the onset of social conflicts in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. The paper’s contribution is threefold. First, I document the effect of temperature shocks on standards of living using cross-section and panel prices data. Second, I link high-resolution temperature data and a new database of 8,528 episodes of social conflicts in France between 1661 and 1789. I use a linear probability model with sub-regional and year fixed effects to establish a causal connection between temperature shocks and conflicts. A one standard deviation increase in temperature increased the probability of social conflicts by about 5.3 per cent. To the best of my knowledge, these results are the first to quantify the effect of temperature shocks on intergroup conflict in pre-industrial Europe. Finally, I investigate the role of local leaders- the intendants- in the mitigation of temperature shocks. I show that leaders with higher level of local experience were better able to cope with adverse weather conditions. I argue that years of local experience were a key determinant in the intendant's ability to administer efficiently his province. This interpretation is supported by historical evidence.