Calendrier du 27 novembre 2023
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 27/11/2023 de 17:00 à 18:30
R1-09
BLUME Andreas (U. of Arizona)
Meaning in Communication Games
This paper addresses two related questions: How can we model the strategic use of a pre-existing language? And, how should we capture different degrees of sharing that language? The paper proposes an iterative procedure, interpreted as a mental process on part of the sender, that associates a set of equilibria, which we dub language equilibria, with every combination of a sender-receiver game and a pre-existing language. Every sender-receiver game has a language equilibrium. Language equilibrium makes sharp predictions about equilibrium outcomes (taken to be joint distributions over types and actions) in common-interest games, in games with sender-ideal equilibria, and in games with partial incentive alignment. Predictions are sensitive to the degree to which language is shared. Importantly, language equilibrium makes predictions about language use, i.e., joint distributions over types, actions, and messages.
Du 27/11/2023 de 12:00 à 13:30
ZHANG Shuang (Imperial College London)
*
Régulation et Environnement
Du 27/11/2023 de 12:00 à 13:30
R1-09
SCHUBERT Katheline(PSE&Paris1)
POMMERET Aude()
RICCI Francesco()
*Confronting the carbon pricing gap: Second best climate policy
Confronted with political opposition to the implementation of efficient carbon pricing, climate policy relies on alternative policy interventions, at a cost in terms of welfare and public finance. In order to evaluate this cost, this paper studies, in the context of the energy transition, second best climate policies constrained to keeping a constant level of the carbon tax and combining it with subsidies to carbon-free electricity generation. This subsidies can take the form of a feed-in premium paid to electricity produced from carbon-free sources, or of subsidies to investment in green capacity. Within a stylized dynamic model where energy may be produced with fossil or carbon-free sources and climate policy aims at satisfying a carbon budget, we define and characterize the carbon pricing gap. We show that if the constant carbon tax is small and therefore the carbon pricing gap large, the subsidy to carbon-free sources should be so large to foster rapid build up of green capacity that it would imply large investment costs and financial burden on the public budget, and a large welfare loss. For a very small constant carbon tax it may be the case that the subsidies have to be maintained even after fossil has been phased-out, to prevent its come back. We calibrate the model to the European energy market to obtain orders of magnitude of the effects.