Calendrier du 27 février 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 27/02/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle E001, RDC Bâtiment E, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SEVERINOV Sergei (University of British Columbia)
Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Budget Constrained Buyers
The paper deals with the optimal and efficient mechanism design for selling to buyers who have commonly known budget constraints. With unequal budgets, our problem is that of asymmetric optimal mechanism design.
We derive and characterize both the optimal and efficient mechanisms.
The optimal mechanism belongs to one of two classes. When the budget differences are small, the
mechanism discriminates only between high-valuation buyers for whom the budget constraint is binding.
All low valuations buyers are treated symmetrically despite budget differences.
When budget differences are sufficiently large, the optimal mechanism
discriminates in favor of buyers with small budgets when the valuations are low, and in favor of buyers with larger budgets when the valuations are high.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 27/02/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle S/19) 75013 Paris
HERGHELEGIU Cristina (ENS-PSE)
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Régulation et Environnement
Du 27/02/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle 8, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JULLIEN Bruno (Toulouse School of Economics)
Privacy Protection
écrit avec Yassine Lefouili et Michael Riordan
We study the incentives of a website to sell its customers? personal information. Third
parties buying that information can either benefi?t or harm consumers, who learn about
their vulnerability to unwanted intrusions through experience. The cost to the website of
selling the information is the risk that bad experience may cause consumers to end their
relationship with the website. The measures adopted by the website to mitigate that
cost are neither contractible nor discernible by consumers. Nevertheless, in equilibrium,
the website has incentives to be cautious about selling information or spend resources to
screen third parties. We characterize the equilibrium privacy policy of the website and its
welfare properties, and discuss the difficulty of welfare-improving regulations.