Calendrier du 27 mars 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 27/03/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ECHENIQUE Frederico (CalTech)
On multiple discount rates
écrit avec Chris Chambers
Disagreements over long-term projects can often be traced to assumptions about the discount rate. The debate in economics over climate change is a case in point. We propose a theory of intertemporal choice that is robust to specific assumptions on the discount rate. Our discussion is centered around three models: The PARETO model requires that one utility stream be chosen over another if and only if its discounted value is higher for all discount factors in a set of possible factors. The UTILITARIAN model focuses on an average discount factor. The MAXMIN model evaluates a ow by the lowest available discounted value. We propose these models as robust decision criteria for intertemporal choice, investigate their properties, and break them down axiomatically.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 27/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle S/19) 75013 Paris
ÖZGÜZEL Cem (CES & IZA)
Learn and Return: Learn and Return: Productive Knowledge Diffusion through Migrant Workers
Régulation et Environnement
Du 27/03/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PLANTINGA Andrew (Bren School of Environmental Science and Management - UC Santa Barbara)
Salience and the Government Provision of Public Goods
écrit avec Matthew Wibbenmeyer et Sarah Anderson
This paper examines the consequences of salience for the government provision of public goods.
Salience is a common behavioral bias whereby people's attention is drawn to salient features of a
decision problem, leading them to overweight prominent information in subsequent judgments.
We analyze the case in which the public's demand for the good is distorted by salient events,
and explore how salience influences public good allocation and efficiency. Theoretical predictions
regarding public good allocation are ambiguous and depend on the magnitude of the change
in payoffs and the extent of salience effects. We test whether salience increases or decreases
allocation of government projects to reduce wildfire severity near wildland-adjacent communities.
Even though the occurrence of a wildfire likely reduces the severity of future fires in the same
area, it may increase the likelihood that fuels management projects are placed nearby if wildfire
events strongly increase the salience of losses under future fires. We find strong evidence that
the salience e ects increase the likelihood of fuels management projects, and use robustness
checks to eliminate competing explanations for our results. Our salience framework may also
offer insights into government responses to terrorism, natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and
environmental catastrophes.