Calendrier du 27 mai 2024
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 27/05/2024 de 17:00 à 18:30
R1-09
LIZZERI Alessandro (Princeton)
Facts and Opinions
We study a sender-receiver communication game with quadratic preferences and an additive sender bias. When the sender can communicate only through verifiable but noisy information and her bias is small, we show that complete information unraveling is not an equilibrium and that more informative equilibria exist. In these equilibria, the sender uses silence not to hide information from the receiver but to communicate that the information she has, while verifiable, is misleading. Thus, mandating disclosure hurts the receiver in these cases. We then enrich our baseline model by allowing the sender to also communicate by using unverifiable information. We illustrate how verifiable and unverifiable information can complement each other and that this complementarity is maximal for moderately biased senders
Paris Migration Economics Seminar
Du 27/05/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-14
This session will welcome Sofia Meister (EHESS et Fellow IC Migrations) and Ilse Ruyssen (Ghent University) around the topic Disentangling the climate-migration-health nexus.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 27/05/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30
R1-09
WOLAK Frank (Stanford University)
Market power and incentive-based capacity payment mechanisms
Recent rolling blackouts in industrialized economies have highlighted the need for
a capacity mechanism to ensure a reliable electricity supply. We demonstrate severe
shortcomings of a popular capacity mechanism—reliability options—caused by their
interaction with fixed-price forward contracts for energy. Large generators can trigger
the reliability option exercise, nullifying the incentive that forward contracts provide
for firms to not exercise market power. Hydroelectric generators sell more forward
contracts and store less water, reducing system reliability. We empirically demonstrate
that Colombian generators respond to these incentives in the short and long run.
The objectives of reliability options could be achieved at lower cost by reforming the
forward contract market.