Calendrier du 27 juin 2019
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 27/06/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
CHAVEZ Emmanuel (Paris School of Economics)
The Effects of R&D Subsidies and Tax Credits: The Case of a Middle-Income Country
écrit avec NOTE: ROOM CHANGE - R2-01
This research builds on literature examining the effects of the two most widely used policies to promote private firm’s innovation and research, namely: direct subsidies and tax credits. In particular, we analyze Mexico’s Programa de Estímulos a la Innovación (PEI) subsidy and Estímulo Fiscal a la Innovación y el Desarrollo de Tecnología (EFIDT) tax credit. PEI rules allow following a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach to identify causal inference, as they define a threshold below which no projects get the grants, and above which some projects are granted. In addition, detailed grading guidelines for both programs allow to construct controls that we can use in a difference-in-difference matching approach. Evidence indicates that the subsidy led firms to hire more innovation personnel and perform more patenting activities. As for the tax credit, estimates suggest it led to more hiring of innovation personnel but not to a change in patenting.
Behavior seminar
Du 27/06/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MASCLET David (Université de Rennes 1)
Using ethical dilemmas to predict anti social choices with real payoff consequences : an experimental study
écrit avec David L. Dickinson
In this paper we investigate the relationship between ethical choices and anti-social behaviours. To address this issue we ran a within-subjects laboratory experiment that included both a classic (hypothetical) moral dilemma (using the well-known Trolley problem) and a real-payoff money-burning experiment. A main contribution is that our Trolley dilemmas separate purely utilitarian from more clearly immoral choice options. Our results show that choices in both environments respond to incentives (i.e., the relative price of the ethical decision), and Trolley problem decisions are consistent with previously known results—individuals prefer no action over action, as well as indirect over direct responsibility, when negative consequences would be similar in either instance. In analyzing the determinants of anti-social money burning, our data identify money burning due to inequality aversion, but we also find some evidence of pure nastiness. Importantly, we find that utilitarian behaviour in the Trolley dilemma is not linked to antisocial money burning, which contrasts with previous conclusions in the literature. Nevertheless, we observe that the willingness to commit more clearly ethically dubious acts in the Trolley problem significantly predicts money burning and, more specifically, nastiness. We conclude that choices in hypothetical environments may be useful for predicting antisocial behaviours that have real payoff consequences and efficiency implications.
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