Calendrier du 28 mars 2019
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 28/03/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-01
MONGEY Simon (University of Chicago)
Labor Market Power
écrit avec David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff
What are the welfare implications of labor market power? We provide an answer to this
question in two steps: (1) develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony
model of the labor market, (2) estimate key parameters using within-firm-states, acrossmarket
differences in wage and employment responses to state corporate tax changes in U.S.
Census data. We validate the model against recent evidence on productivity-wage passthrough,
and new measurements of the distribution of market concentration. The model
implies welfare losses from labor market power range from 2.9 to 8.0 percent of lifetime
consumption. However, despite large contemporaneous losses, labor market power has not
contributed to the declining labor share. Finally, we show that minimum wages can deliver
moderate welfare gains by reallocating workers from smaller to larger, more productive
firms.
Texte intégral
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 28/03/2019 de 12:30 à 13:45
PELLIZZARI Michele (University of Geneva)
Distance Learning in Higher Education: Evidence from a Randomised Experiment
écrit avec Co-authors: P. Cacault, C. Hildebrand, and J. Laurent-Lucchetti
Using a randomised experiment at the University of Geneva, we study the impact of on-line live streaming of lectures on achievement and attendance. We find that (i) students use the streaming technology only punctually, seemingly when attending in class is too costly; (ii) attending lectures via live streaming lowers achievement for low ability students and improves it for high ability ones and (iii) offering this service reduces in-class attendance only mildly.
Behavior seminar
Du 28/03/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
HERZ Holger (Universität Freiburg)
Clarity in Relational Contracts: Rules vs. Principles
Recent work in organizational economics stresses the importance of clarity in relational contracts as a reason behind the persistent performance differences that we observe between seemingly similar enterprises. Even though the conditions necessary to establish cooperation through relational contracts are straightforward in theory, in practice establishing a relational contract poses a number of difficult challenges. Specifically, trading parties face the clarity problem: they need to establish mutual understanding about the content of the relational contract and they need to succeed in adapting this mutual understanding to new situations when the environment changes. We hypothesize that building the relational contract on general principles, rather than relying on specific but narrow rules, helps achieve clarity and improves performance in repeated games with uncertainty about the future, and report results from an experiment assessing this hypothesis.