Calendrier du 28 mars 2024
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 28/03/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
GONZALES-AGUADO Eugenia (TSE)
Labor mobility over the business cycle
This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of internal migration in an economy with labor market frictions and quantifies its role in mitigating asymmetric shocks. Labor mobility is viewed as a key mechanism to stabilize the economy from regional shocks in currency unions. However, this view does not take into account the equilibrium effects of worker mobility in the presence of search frictions. First, I gather new evidence connecting individual migration decisions to aggregate economic outcomes over the business cycle. I show that during the Great Recession in the United States labor flows across states strongly responded to changes in economic conditions. Moreover, I find that in economic expansions job-to-job transitions account for most of the interstate movements, whereas during downturns there is a significant increase in the relocation of unemployed workers across states. Then, I develop an equilibrium model with fluctuations in aggregate productivity in which search frictions are crucial to generating the observed patterns in the data, and in particular, to explain the procyclicality of migration. I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy during the Great Recession and study the implications of labor mobility on local and aggregate labor markets.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 28/03/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-21
WALDINGER Fabian (LMU Munich)
Climbing the Ivory Tower: How Socio-Economic Background Shapes Academia
écrit avec Ran Abramitzky, Lena Greska, Santiago Perez, Joseph Price, and Carlo Schwarz
This paper explores the impact of socioeconomic background on academic careers in the United States. We construct a novel dataset that links the near-universe of US academics to full-count censuses, allowing for a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between parental occupation, socioeconomic status, and academic outcomes. The findings indicate that US academics are heavily selected based on socioeconomic background, with having a father who was a professor serving as the strongest predictor of becoming a professor oneself. We also document significant variations in socioeconomic selectivity by academic discipline and university. Conditional on making it to academia, there are no differences in careers and scientific productivity, indicating that the initial selection process may play a crucial role in determining one's academic success. Additionally, we show that socioeconomic background influences a scientist's choice of subfield and thereby the direction of research.
Du 28/03/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-14
SATPATHY Aviman (PSE)
*
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 28/03/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-14
FRANKEL David (Melbourne Business School)
Equilibrium Selection in Participation Games, with Applications to Security Issuance
In many applied settings, an activity requires a critical mass of participants to be worthwhile. This can give rise to multiple equilibria. We study seven well-known equilibrium selection theories: two heuristic arguments, two models with rational players, and three from the evolutionary literature. With one exception, each relies on strategic complementarities. We weaken this to a mild single crossing property and show that the theories' predictions have a common form: an agent plays a best response to some fictional distribution of the participation rate of her opponents. We then use this robust framework to study security design in a setting in which issuance revenue is used to fund investments that are, in turn, used to pay distributions on the securities. We show that all monotone securities are underpriced and that debt is optimal as it is the least underpriced. Moreover, underpricing in equity offerings can be mitigated by share rationing and a minimum sales requirement.
Texte intégral
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 28/03/2024 de 12:30 à 14:00
Sciences Po
ANGELUCCI Charles (MIT Sloan School of Management)
*
Behavior seminar
Du 28/03/2024 de 11:00 à 12:00
R2-21
CASELLA Alessandra (Columbia)
Women, Men, and Polya Urns. On the Persistence of Underrepresentation
écrit avec Laura Caron, Alessandra Casella and Victoria Mooers
In a world where the majority and the minority group have equal distributions of talent, where candidates are objectively and accurately evaluated, and no discrimination occurs, the underrepresentation of the minority group in selective positions is nonetheless highly sticky. If the sample of candidates from the minority group is numerically smaller, at equal distribution of talent, the most qualified candidate is more likely to belong to the majority sample, mirroring its larger numerical size. If future samples of candidates respond to the realized selection in the expected direction–increasing if the selection came from the sample, decreasing or increasing less if it did not–the higher probability of success in the majority sample will persist. We capture this process with a well-known statistical model: the Polya urn. The richness of existing results and the streamlined model allow us to study and compare different policy interventions. A simple app (https://caron.shinyapps.io/Women-Men-Polya-Urns/) allows readers to run their own experiments. Two robust results are that temporary affirmative actions interventions have long -term equalizing effects, and that any decline in the quality of selected candidates is self-correcting, even while the intervention lasts.