Calendrier du 28 avril 2023
EU Tax Observatory Seminar
Du 28/04/2023 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle R1.13
BASELGIA Enea ( University of St. Gallen)
The Compliance Effects of the Automatic Exchange of Information: Evidence from the Swiss Tax Amnesty
This paper studies the effectiveness of the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) in fighting tax evasion. AEOI via the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) is an international agreement that enables the yearly exchange of information between countries without having to request it, thereby improving tax transparency. Exploiting quasi-random policy variation, administrative wealth tax returns, and granular amnesty data for Switzerland, I find: (i) 69% of the total 156k participants were pushed into the Swiss amnesty by the AEOI. (ii) Out of 66.4 billion Swiss francs (or 10% of GDP) of hidden assets uncovered, 53% are attributable to the AEOI. (iii) The effects on tax compliance appear significant and long-lasting. On average, reported taxable wealth rises by about 60% after a voluntary self-disclosure and remains at this level in subsequent years. Moreover, using micro-level amnesty data, I show that tax evasion is likely more widespread and more evenly distributed in Switzerland relative to other European countries—which is consistent with Switzerland’s lack of third- party reporting prior to the AEOI in 2017.
Brown Bag Economics of Innovation Seminar
Du 28/04/2023 de 10:00 à 11:00
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85442648435?pwd=RVZGOWgyTm9VZjFFM3NnR09RbVNhdz09
écrit avec Pierre Boyer École polytechnique–CREST
This paper studies the tax treatment of couples. We use two different approaches. One is tailored to the analysis of tax systems that stick to the principle that the tax base for couples is the sum of their incomes. One is tailored to the analysis of reforms toward individual taxation. We study the US federal income tax since the 1960s through the lens of this framework. We find that, in the recent past, realizing efficiency gains requires lowering marginal tax rates for secondary earners. We also find that revenue-neutral reforms towards individual taxation are in the interest of couples with high secondary earnings while couples with low secondary earnings are worse off. The support for such a reform recently passed the majority threshold. It is rejected, however, by a Rawlsian social welfare function. Thus, there is a tension between Rawlsian and Feminist notions of social welfare.