Calendrier du 28 septembre 2023
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 28/09/2023 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
STEPANCHUK Serhiy (University of Southampton)
Till the IRS Do Us Part: (Optimal) Taxation of Households
écrit avec Hans A. Holter and Dirk Krueger
Texte intégral
Du 28/09/2023 de 16:00 à 17:00
R1-14
HANNAH Leslie()
ZERBINI Antoine()
Large quoted manufacturing employers circa 1880: why the UK and France led the US in the scale and scope of enterprise and the divorce of ownership from control
Du 28/09/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HANNAH Leslie()
ZERBINI Antoine()
*
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 28/09/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-15
ZERBINI Antoine (LSE)
Segment and Rule: Modern Censorship in Authoritarian Regimes (with Kun Heo)
The internet grants citizens with the ability to choose which media outlets to consume. This access to foreign independent outlets risks exposing citizens to negative information about the authoritarian regime. In response to this novel threat, authoritarian regimes introduced censorship firewalls which seem to fail at their task: millions bypass these restrictions everyday. We contend that the regime deliberately aims for a specific segment of the population to self-select into bypassing the firewall: regime opponents. By bypassing the firewall, opponents are occasionally convinced to comply after seeing positive and credible reporting about the regime by banned foreign outlets. The firewall ensures that regime supporters exclusively consume content from domestic outlets and so their compliance is secured via regime propaganda. We label this strategy one of segment-and-rule and show how it maximizes compliance. We also explain how authoritarian regimes can engineer segment-and-rule by making local outlets parrot the party line, investing in domestic entertainment or strategically banning foreign entertainment. By providing citizens with more choice, the internet may have entrenched authoritarian regimes.
Macro Workshop
Du 28/09/2023 de 12:00 à 14:00
R2-21
CAMOUS Antoine (PSE)
Central Bank Strategic Communication and the Dynamics of Reputation
Why, when and how should a central bank (mis)report private information?
This paper studies the incentives and the ability of a central bank to stabilize the economy through strategically distorted announcements. Three messages stand out. First, strategic communication designed to mitigate dispersion costs from sector specific shocks complements standard policy interventions in stabilizing the economy. Second, communication is subject to a commitment tension that undermines control of private beliefs and effective stabilization. Finally, central bank reputation provides valuable incentives to support effective strategic communication.
Behavior seminar
Du 28/09/2023 de 11:00 à 12:00
R2-21
SCARELLI Thiago (PSE)
Worker’s Preference over Payment Schedules: Evidence from Ride-Hailing Drivers
An occupation is usually characterized as a combination of what people do and how much they are paid for it, with little attention to the fact that work arrangements also define when people are paid for their labor. This paper contributes to this discussion by investigating how much value people assign to having a short delay between their tasks and the associated compensation. Using a national experimental survey with ridesharing drivers in Brazil, I document that this population is willing to forgo about 40 percent of their earnings, on average, to receive on the same day of their rides, compared to the alternative of being paid with a month's delay. Text analysis methods provide evidence that short delay-to-pay tends to be more critical if working more hours is one's primary adjustment margin in response to financial emergencies. Finally, I provide experimental evidence that increased attention to their domestic budget can make drivers marginally more likely to take up delayed compensation under large multipliers. Those three results suggest that the payment schedule can be a crucial labor market feature for workers under constrained liquidity.