Calendrier du 29 novembre 2021
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 29/11/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
On line
YAMASHITA Takuro (TSE)
A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
écrit avec Niccolo Lomys
We study the role of information structures in mechanism design problems with limited commitment. In each period, a principal offers a “spot” contract to a privately informed agent without committing to future spot contracts, and the agent responds to the contract. In contrast to the classical approach in which the information structure is fixed, we allow for all admissible information structures. We represent the information structure as a fictitious mediator and re-interpret the model as a mechanism design problem by the mediator with commitment. The mediator collects the agent’s private information and then, in each period, privately recommends the principal’s spot contract and the agent’s response in an incentive-compatible manner (both in truth-telling and obedi ence). We provide several examples to identify why new equilibrium outcomes can arise once we allow for general information structures. We next develop a durable-good monopoly application. We show that trading outcomes and wel fare consequences can substantially differ from those in the classical model with a fixed information structure. In the seller-optimal mechanism, the seller offers a discounted price to the high-valuation buyer only in the initial period, followed by the high, surplus-extracting price until some endogenous deadline, when the buyer’s information is revealed and hence fully extracted. As a result, the Coase conjecture fails: even in the limiting case of perfect patience, the seller makes a positive surplus, and the trading outcome is not the first best. We also charac terize mediated and unmediated implementation of the seller-optimal outcome.
Econometrics Seminar
Du 29/11/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
ESCANCIANO Juan Carlos (UC3M)
Debiased Semiparametric U-Statistics: with an Application to Inequality of Opportunity
Régulation et Environnement
Du 29/11/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R2-21 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
DECHEZLEPRETRE Antoine (LSE/OECD)
Climate policy uncertainty and firms’ and investors’ behavior
Whether and how firms are affected by uncertainty revolving around the implementation of climate policy is crucial to understand firms’ behavior and short-term versus long-run planning as well as to shed light on the potential for systemic risk related with the coordinated implementation of ambitious climate policy. Hence, we develop a new index of climate policy uncertainty, covering the United States with monthly-level variation between 1990 and 2018. We analyze the relationship between climate policy uncertainty and firm-level outcomes such as share price, share price volatility, investments in research and development, and employment for all publicly-listed firms in the country. We find that climate policy uncertainty tends to affect negatively all these outcomes, and often more so than existing indices of economic policy uncertainty. Further, we leverage the fact that climate policy requires the transition from a “dirty” to a low-carbon equilibrium, with progress and setbacks along the road, which create a promising context to analyze short-term versus long-run planning and belief revision. Consistently with expectations, we find that climate policy uncertainty can lead to positive effects on the abovementioned outcomes in periods of setbacks and when uncertainty is driven by failure in the climate policy process rather than success.