Calendrier du 29 février 2024
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 29/02/2024
Using Zoom
By Rohan Kekre (Chicago Booth) and Moritz Lenel (Princeton).
Texte intégral
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 29/02/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-21
CASTELLS-QUINTANA David (UAB)
The far-reaching distributional effects of global warming: Evidence from half a century of climate and inequality data
Climate change is already impacting several development outcomes, including economic growth, human health and mortality, agricultural productivity and even conflict. Moreover, the impact of climate change is expected to be unevenly distributed across locations and population groups. In particular, the worst effects of climate change are expected to be felt in low-income countries. Similarly, within countries, the most vulnerable to these effects are typically low-income regions and households. While the literature to date has provided evidence of the between-countries inequality-increasing effect of global warming, evidence for inequality within countries remains limited. In this paper, we empirically explore the connection between climate change and long-run distributional dynamics within countries. To do so, we first build a global panel dataset combining gridded data on climate variables with gridded population data, and country-level data on a range of inequality measures and development outcomes. We use these data to test climate effects on several dimensions of inequality, including the (interpersonal) distribution of income, using traditional Gini coefficients, indices of concentration of both income and wealth, proxies of inequality in the spatial distribution of economic activity within countries, and measures of inequality in life expectancy. We complement our country-level analysis with an analysis at the subnational level for selected countries (US, Russia and Spain). Our evidence shows a clear positive and statistically significant relationship between higher temperatures and increases in different measures and dimensions of inequality, both at the country and subnational level. The role of higher temperatures is robust to a wide range of controls, different specifications and estimation techniques.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 29/02/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R2-01
USHCHEV Philipp (ULB)
The Network Origins of Entry
We develop a model of the process of entry under social learning via word-of-mouth (WOM). An
incumbent's product is known to the consumers, while the success of a potential entrant hinges on
creating consumers' awareness of the entrant's product through WOM. We model WOM as a
percolation process on a random graph. We show that whether an entrant can gain a non-negligible
level of awareness depends on the social network structure via two sufficient statistics,
which are the ratios of different factorial moments of the degree distribution. We categorize the
different pricing equilibria into the classical blockaded, deterred, and accommodated entry
taxonomy. Under deterred entry, our model produces a model of limit pricing by an incumbent to
prevent an entrant gaining a non-negligible level of awareness. When we focus on a multinomial logit
demand, we show that increasing the network density shifts the pricing equilibrium from
blockaded to deterred, and finally to accommodated entry. We also show that the aggregate
consumer surplus may be non-monotonic with respect to network density. Finally, if the incumbent
has knowledge about the consumer's number of friends and can charge personalised prices, we
find that it is optimal for the incumbent to charge lower prices to more connected consumers.
Behavior seminar
Du 29/02/2024 de 11:00 à 12:00
R2.21
MECHTENBERG Lydia ((University of Hamburg, Germany) )
Fairness in Matching Markets: Experimental Evidence
écrit avec Dorothea Kübler, Tobias König, Lydia Mechtenberg, and Renke Schmacker
We investigate fairness preferences regarding matching mechanisms by employing
a spectator design. Participants choose whether they want to make a costly voting
decision for the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played
by other participants. The Boston mechanism generates justified envy since some
participants are forced to submit their true preferences, while the strategy-proof SD
satisfies envy-freeness. A high share of individuals vote for the Boston mechanism
when priorities are based on merit, and this share further increases when priorities
are determined by luck. At the same time, fairness as envy-freeness and strategyproofness
plays a role in people's revealed preferences when the priorities are based on
merit. The results suggest that fairness as envy-freeness and strategy-proofness plays
a role for spectators' voting decisions but many people believe that clever strategic
choices create entitlements on their own.
Behavior Working Group
Du 29/02/2024 de 10:00 à 11:00
R1-09
DA COSTA Shaun (PSE)
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