Calendrier du 29 septembre 2014
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 29/09/2014 de 17:00 à 18:15
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage ) 75013 Paris
MOREIRA Humberto (Fundação Getulio Vargas’ Brazilian School of Economics and Finance)
Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
écrit avec Co-author : Daniel Gottlieb
We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Agents have private information about the distribution of outputs conditional on each effort and, possibly, the cost of effort. We prove existence, characterize the solution, and establish several general properties of the resulting multidimensional screening problem. A positive mass of types with low conditional probabilities of success gets a constant payment and zero rents. Exclusion is desirable if and only if it is first-best efficient. Unlike in pure adverse selection models, there is distortion everywhere: the region of types who exert high effort is contained in the interior of the first-best high-effort region. Under additional conditions, the optimal mechanism offers only finitely many contracts. For example, if the agent is risk neutral and has limited liability, all agents are offered a single contract. Our model, therefore, provides a multidimensional screening rationale for the lack of rich menus of contracts observed in certain environments. We apply our framework to multidimensional generalizations of canonical models in insurance, regulation, and optimal taxation and show that it generates novel results.
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Macro Workshop
Du 29/09/2014 de 17:00 à 18:15
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage ) 75013 Paris
MOREIRA Humberto (FGV/EPGE-FUNDATION GETULIO VARGAS- ESCOLA BRASILEIRA DE ECONOMIA )
Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
écrit avec Co-author : Daniel Gottlieb
We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Agents have private information about the distribution of outputs conditional on each effort and, possibly, the cost of effort. We prove existence, characterize the solution, and establish several general properties of the resulting multidimensional screening problem. A positive mass of types with low conditional probabilities of success gets a constant payment and zero rents. Exclusion is desirable if and only if it is first-best efficient. Unlike in pure adverse selection models, there is distortion everywhere: the region of types who exert high effort is contained in the interior of the first-best high-effort region. Under additional conditions, the optimal mechanism offers only finitely many contracts. For example, if the agent is risk neutral and has limited liability, all agents are offered a single contract. Our model, therefore, provides a multidimensional screening rationale for the lack of rich menus of contracts observed in certain environments. We apply our framework to multidimensional generalizations of canonical models in insurance, regulation, and optimal taxation and show that it generates novel results.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 29/09/2014 de 12:00 à 13:00
MSE Room S19
XU Meina (PSE)
Intermediaries and quality sorting in China