Calendrier du 30 septembre 2021
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 30/09/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-14
CROWLEY Meredith (University of Cambridge)
Dominant Currency Dynamics: Evidence on Dollar-invoicing from UK Exporters
écrit avec Han, L. and Son, M
How do the choices of individual firms contribute to the dominance of a currency in global trade? Using export transactions data from the UK over 2010-2016, we document strong evidence of two mechanisms that promote the use of a dominant currency: (1) prior experience: the probability that a firm invoices its exports to a new market in a dominant currency is increasing in the number of years the firm has used the dominant currency in its existing markets; (2) strategic complementarity: a firm is more likely to invoice its exports in the currency chosen by the majority of its competitors in a foreign destination market in order to stabilize its residual demand in that market. We show that the introduction of a fixed cost of currency management into a model of invoicing currency choice yields dynamic paths of currency choice that match our empirical findings.
Texte intégral
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 30/09/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2.21, Campus Jourdan
ROHNER Dominic (Université de Lausanne)
Donor Attention and Civil Unrest in Africa
écrit avec with Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois and Rogerio Santarrosa
Governments may be tempted to crack down on the opposition when the attention of donor countries is distracted. As strategic reaction to this, the opposition will have incentive to not incite such crackdowns. At the level of individuals, with agitations already under way, agents will substitute visible forms of unrest (riots) for more covert operations on soft targets (civilian targeted violence). We start from a simple game-theoretic model of the strategic interaction between the government and opposition in the face of anticipated versus unanticipated shocks. The empirical test of the theory exploits both unanticipated (disaster) and anticipated (election) shocks taking place in major donor countries to explain different forms of social violence in recipient countries. Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that in times when a given government has "leeway" to repress, the opposition reacts by reducing public agitations. But this is accompanied by increased violence towards private, pro-government, citizens. This implies that international lack of attention hurts democratic oppositions through the out-of-equilibrium threat of repression, and has knock on violent effects, even when on the surface the situation appears "calm". Thus, observed political crackdowns may only represent the "tip of the iceberg", and policies that would enhance international scrutiny would help safeguard public demonstrations of dissent, and reduce violence against civilians.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 30/09/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-14 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
HERRERA Helios (Warwick)
Echo chamber elections
écrit avec Ravideep SETHI
Elections aggregate information of citizens who gather information, in part from mainstream news, but possibly to a large extent from their different echo chambers which filter news in particular ways. We study information aggregation and electoral outcomes in the presence of endogenous echo chambers. Citizens choose their echo chambers in a self-serving way, in part to shield them from the outside world (mainstream news) and thus preserve their political faith as often as possible. The key asymmetry is how isolated citizens are, namely how much they trust/distrust mainstream news to begin with. We study in several contexts the electoral advantage that the side with more isolated followers may have. This advantage can turn into a sure electoral victory regardless of the true state of the world, thereby failing information aggregation, in some instances. Information aggregation still fails if voters can abstain, don’t fully trust their echo chamber sources either, or gain utility from consuming favourable news.