Calendrier du 31 janvier 2023
Job Market Seminar
Du 31/01/2023 de 13:00 à 14:15
R2-01
D ADAMO Riccardo (University College London)
Orthogonal Policy Learning Under Ambiguity
This paper studies the problem of estimating individualized treatment rules when treatment effects are partially identified, as it is often the case with observational data. By
drawing connections between the treatment assignment problem and classical decision theory, we characterize several notions of optimal treatment policies in the presence of partial
identification. The proposed framework allows to incorporate user-defined constraints on
the policies, such as restrictions for transparency or interpretability, while also ensuring
computational feasibility. We show that partial identification leads to a novel statistical
learning problem with risk directionally – but not fully – differentiable with respect to an
infinite-dimensional nuisance component. We propose an estimation procedure that ensures
Neyman-orthogonality with respect to the nuisance component and provide statistical guarantees that depend on the amount of concentration around the points of non-differentiability
in the data-generating process. The proposed method is illustrated using data from the Job
Partnership Training Act study.
Texte intégral
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 31/01/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2.21
GüNTHER Laurenz (University of Bonn)
Political Representation Gaps in Europe
Do parliaments in representative democracies represent the policy attitudes of their voters? I examine this question using both data on the policy attitudes of 2,074 parliamentarians and 31,461 citizens who are representative of 27 European countries and a novel estimation framework that I validate with referendum data. I find large and systematic “representation gaps.” Parliaments are more progressive on cultural issues than voters in nearly all countries. On economic issues, they tend to be more market-oriented than voters, but this result varies by country. These results are at odds with the standard assumption of vote-share maximizing politicians. I theoretically and empirically explain the existence of representation gaps through a perceived competence advantage of some politicians that enables them to implement their preferred policies. Representation gaps help explain distrust in democracy and the existence of populist parties, which fill representation gaps. These findings suggest that reversing the rise of populism and increasing trust in democratic institutions requires established parties to close representation gaps. Finally, it informs policymakers on how to reposition themselves to do so.