Calendrier du 31 mai 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 31/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
YASH BHATIYA Apurav (University of Warwick)
Do Enfranchised Immigrants Affect Political Behaviour?
This paper analyses 3 million UK Parliament speeches between 1972 and 2011 to understand how enfranchised immigrants affect political behaviour towards existing and prospective immigrants. Since the birth of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1931, the immigrants from commonwealth countries in the UK have a right to vote in the national elections, while the non-commonwealth immigrants do not have this enfranchisement power. I find an increase in the share of enfranchised immigrants makes the incumbent spend more time in the Parliament talking about immigrants, address immigrants with a positive sentiment and vote to make immigration tougher. An increase in disenfranchised immigrants leads to the opposite effect. The enfranchised immigrants undertake more socio-political actions (signing a petition, participating in protests, contacting a politician etc.) compared to disenfranchised immigrants, which drives politician's behaviour. Disenfranchised immigrants only start catching up with the enfranchised immigrants after naturalisation.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 31/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
HAYASHI Takashi (University of Glasgow)
Social discount rate: spaces for agreement
écrit avec Co-author: MIchele Lombardi
We study the problem of aggregating discounted utility preferences
into a social discounted utility preference model. We use an axiom capturing
a social responsibility of individuals' attitudes to time, called consensus
Pareto. We show that this axiom can provide consistent foundations for
welfare judgments. Moreover, in conjunction with the standard axioms of
anonymity and continuity, consensus Pareto can help adjudicate some
fundamental issues related to the choice of the social discount rate: the
society selects the rate through a generalized median voter scheme.
Texte intégral
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 31/05/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/95087063366?pwd=NjhMT2xKWTlnb3B0dS9veGFicm1BUT09
REVERDY Camille (University of Paris 1 )
Technical regulations, intermediate inputs and sourcing decisions
écrit avec Irene Iodice (Paris 1)
Motivated by the growing share of technical standards regulating intermediate inputs, this paper investigates the role of standards in the sourcing decisions of international firms. We begin by building a novel database which fills the missing information on the product classification of all technical barriers to trade (TBTs) that have been notified to the WTO over the period 1995-2020, improving on the coverage of TBTs compared to existing sources. We combine this information with a World Bank database on the depth of trade agreements, including information such as the inclusion of specific provisions on TBT. We then cross-reference this database with a firm-level panel of French importers. We find that the introduction of a TBT by the European Union affect French firms' incentive to source its inputs within the EU. Following the enforcement of a TBT by the EU, we observe that the propensity to switch supplier country depends on firms' characteristics.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 31/05/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
Online
YOUNG BRUN Marie (PSE)
The political economy of carbon taxation with vertical and horizontal inequality
This paper investigates how majority voting over a carbon tax is impacted by the distribution of the tax burden. I introduce both income and urban-rural inequalities in a majority voting framework. To capture heterogeneity in salient carbon-intensive expenditures, such as car fuel or heating energy, urbans and rurals differ by the amount of subsistence polluting good they must consume. The analytical results show (i) polarization of the vote around the urban-rural divide can occur when the necessity consumption of carbon-intensive good is suffciently large; (ii) the majority tax rate can be over- or under-effcient, compared to the pigouvian rate, depending on the relative size of the income and the urban-rural inequalities.
Calibrating the model using Household Budget Survey micro-data for France, I investigate how comple- mentary policies affect the vote over carbon tax. Recycling the tax revenue lump-sum has a small but positive effect on the majority voting tax. The adopted tax rises both with a subsidy policy reducing polluting ne- cessity consumption for the rural population e.g. subsidizing effciency-improving heating renovations and with a policy reducing the proportion of rurals. But the former additionally reduces the political polarization around the urban-rural divide, while the later exacerbates it. Future work analyzes whether some European countries are more likely to be politically affected by the distributional impacts of the urban-rural divide and income inequality, using the European data available in the Eurostat HBS dataset.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 31/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
PATTY Morgan (LEDa, PSL)
Top Dominance
To deal with issues of inconsistency faced by iterated elimination of weakly or strictly dominated strategies (IEWDS or IESDS), we propose a new elimination procedure. Our procedure, named iterated elimination of top dominated strategies (IETDS), is based on the new notion of top dominance. It is more consistent than IESDS in a certain sense. Top dominance is more restrictive than weak dominance (and may be more restrictive than strict dominance): it requires weak dominance and strict payoff domination of the strategy on a specific profiles set. Furthermore, it requires that the dominating strategy to be not weakly dominated. Contrary to IESDS, IETDS may reduce the set of Nash equilibria (whilst never eliminating strict Nash equilibria) without the problems of order dependence, mutability and spurious Nash equilibria encountered by IEWDS and IESDS.