Calendrier du mois de janvier 2015
Job Market Seminar
Du 30/01/2015 de 12:30 à 13:45
MSE – Room: à préciser 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris
SANT'ANNA Pedro H.C. (UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID )
Nonparametric Tests for Conditional Treatment Effects with Duration Outcomes
This paper proposes new nonparametric tests for treatment e ects when the out- come of interest, typically a duration, is subjected to right censoring. Our tests are based on Kaplan-Meier integrals, and do not rely on distributional assumptions, shape restrictions, nor on restricting the potential treatment e ect heterogeneity across dif- ferent subpopulations. The proposed tests are consistent against xed alternatives and can detect nonparametric alternatives converging to the null at the parametric n????1=2-rate, n being the sample size. Finite sample properties of the proposed tests are examined by means of a Monte Carlo study. We illustrate the use of the proposed pol- icy evaluation tools by studying the e ect of labor market programs on unemployment duration based on experimental and observational datasets.
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Job Market Seminar
Du 29/01/2015 de 12:30 à 13:45
MSE – Room: S/1 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris
CAMPONOVO Lorenzo (UNIVERSITY OF ST.GALLEN)
On the Validity of the Pairs Bootstrap for Lasso Estimators
We study the validity of the pairs bootstrap for Lasso estimators in linear regression models with random covariates and heteroscedastic error terms. We show that the naive pairs bootstrap does not consistently estimate the distribution of the Lasso estimator. In particular, we identify two different sources for the failure of the bootstrap. First, in the bootstrap samples the Lasso estimator fails to correctly mimic the population moment condition satisfied by the regression parameter. Second, the bootstrap Lasso estimation criterion does not reproduce the sign of the zero coefficients with sufficient accuracy. To overcome these problems we introduce a modified pairs bootstrap procedure that consistently estimates the distribution of the Lasso estimator. Finally, we consider also the adaptive Lasso estimator. Also in this case, we show that the modified pairs bootstrap consistently estimates the distribution of the adaptive Lasso estimator. Monte Carlo simulations confirm a desirable accuracy of the modified pairs bootstrap procedure. These results show that when properly defined the pairs bootstrap may provide a valid approach for estimating the distribution of Lasso estimators.
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 28/01/2015 de 18:00 à 19:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
DRUT Bastien (CNAM)
Economie du football professionnel
Development Economics Seminar
Du 28/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
BRYAN Gharad (LSE)
The Costs of Spatial Labor Misallocation: Evidence from Indonesia
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 27/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment B, 2e étage, Salle de Réunions
BENHENDA Asma (PSE)
How to Identify Good Teachers? Teacher Evaluations and Student Achievement.
Job Market Seminar
Du 27/01/2015 de 12:30 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
DZEMSKI Andreas (UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM)
An empirical model of dyadic link formation in a network with unobserved heterogeneity
In this paper I present a new model of dyadic link formation for directed networks that extends the classical model by Holland and Leinhardt 1981. Agents are endowed with unobserved effects that govern their ability to establish links (productivity) and to receive links (popularity). The unobserved effects are modelled by a fixed effects approach allowing for arbitrary correlation between the observed homophily component and latent sources of degree heterogeneity. The model can be estimated by conditional ML but inference is non-standard due to the incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott 1948). I consider estimation of the parametric part of the linking model as well as estimation of a measure of network transitivity. Moreover, I suggest a specification test for the dyadic model based on predicted transitivity. My approach overcomes the incidental parameters problem by using explicit correction formulas based on an asymptotic approximation that sends the number of agents to infinity. My simulation design suggests promising finite sample performance. A linking model neglecting unobserved sources of degree heterogeneity predicts an insuficient amount of transitivity. This effect is proven for a stylized model and its empirical relevance is confirmed using data on favor networks in Indian villages. In this application, a transitivity statistic changes sign when unobserved agent effects are added. This suggests that, in the real world, unobserved heterogeneity may be a primary driver of local clustering behavior.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 26/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
LAMBA Rohit (CAMBRIDGE)
Repeated Bargaining: A Mechanism Design Approach SALLE 10
Through a model of repeated bargaining between a buyer and a seller, with changing private information on both sides, this paper addresses questions of eciency and institutional structures in dynamic mechanism design. A new technical device in the form of a history dependent version of payo equivalence is established. A new notion of interim budget balance is introduced which allows for the role of an intermediary but with bounded credit lines. We then construct a mechanism, which provides a necessary and sucient condition for eciency under interim budget balance. The existence of a future surplus can be used as collateral to sustain eciency, and its size determines the possibility. The mechanism also o ers a simple and realistic implementation. A characterization of ecient implementation under ex post budget balance is also provided. Further, a characterization for the second best is presented, and its equivalent Ramsey pricing formulation is established. A suboptimal, but incentive compatible mechanism for the second best with intuitive properties is presented. When property rights are uid, that is, the good can be shared, a folk theorem with a simple mechanism is constructed.
RISK Working Group
Du 22/01/2015 de 17:30 à 18:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
VERGNAUD Jean-Christophe (CNRS PARIS 1)
Stabilité des préférences dans le risque après une expérience à fort impact psychologique
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 21/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
MSE-salle B2.2
RISTINIEMI Annukka ()
A Laffer curve of sovereign debt and liquidity
WIP (Work in progress) Working Group
Du 21/01/2015 de 13:00 à 14:30
Salle de réunion du département des Sciences Sociales
DUPRAZ Yannick(University College Dublin)
VILLAR Paola(PSE)
LEROUX Mélissa()
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La Francafrique: Does part of French Aid to Africa Finance French Electoral Campaigns?
Bayesian Model Selection and Big Data: Construction of high-frequency well-being indices from Google Trends Data
Preference for Income Unobservability and Informal Redistribution in Community and Kin Networks: A Lab-in-the-field Experiment in Senegal
Job Market Seminar
Du 21/01/2015 de 12:30 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
KETZ Philipp (BROWN UNIVERSITY)
Testing near or at the Boundary of the Parameter Space
Statistical inference about a scalar parameter is often performed using the two-sided ttest. In extremum problems, where the estimator satis es the restrictions on the parameter space - such as the nonnegativity of a variance parameter -, the test su ers from size distortions when the true parameter vector is near or at the boundary of the parameter space. Nevertheless, the two-sided t-test continues to be used when estimates are found to be close to the boundary. This can be attributed to a lack of inference procedures that appropriately account for boundary e ects on the asymptotic distribution of the estimator. To address this issue, we propose an estimator that is asymptotically normally distributed, even when the true parameter vector is near or at the boundary, and the objective function is not de ned outside the parameter space. The novel estimator allows the implementation of several existing testing procedures and a new test based on the Conditional Likelihood Ratio statistic (CLR). Compared to the existing procedures, the new test is easy to implement and has good power properties. Moreover, it o ers power advantages over the two-sided t-test, when the latter controls size. We also show the test to be admissible when inference is performed with respect to a scalar parameter. We apply the test to the random coecients logit model using data on the European car market and nd more evidence of heterogeneity in consumer preferences than suggested by the two-sided t-test.
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 20/01/2015 de 16:30 à 18:00
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - room 19) 75013 Paris
CAVAILLE Charlotte (HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES)
Social Policy Preferences in Mature Welfare States: the Role of Reciprocity
écrit avec Discussant: Elvire GUILLAUD (University Paris 1, CES)
NGOs, Development and Globalization
Du 20/01/2015 de 14:00 à 18:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
écrit avec 14:30-15:30 Michel GENET Greenpeace, the (beautiful?) and unknown NGO 15:30-16:00 Coffee Break 16:00-17:00 Malika Hamadi (Cergy University) Competition, Loan Rates and Information Dispersion in Microcredit Market". 17:00-18:00 Discussion around ongoing and future work
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 19/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
HENRANDEZ-LAGOS Pablo (NYU)
Political Identity and Trust
We explore how political identity affects trust. Using an incentivized experimental survey we vary information about partners' partisan identity to elicit trust behavior and beliefs. By eliciting beliefs, we are able to assess whether differences in trust rates are due to stereotyping or a "taste for discrimination." By measuring actual trustworthiness, we are able to determine whether beliefs are statistically correct. We find that trust is pervasive and depends on the partisan identity of the trustee. Differential trust rates are explained by incorrect stereotypes about the other's lack of trustworthiness rather than by a "taste for discrimination.
Job Market Seminar
Du 19/01/2015 de 12:15 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
LAFFERS Lukas (NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS )
Bounding Average Treatment Effects using Linear Programming
This paper presents a method of calculating sharp bounds on the average treatment effect using linear programming under identifying assumptions commonly used in the literature. This new method provides a sensitivity analysis of the identifying assumptions and missing data in an application regarding the effect of parent’s schooling on children’s schooling. Even a mild departure from identifying assumptions may substantially widen the bounds on average treatment effects. Allowing for a small fraction of the data to be missing also has a large impact on the results.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 16/01/2015 de 13:00 à 14:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
BERTELLI Olivia (PSE)
Fertility, food security and agriculture production in times of climate shocks
Development Economics Seminar
Du 14/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
SADOULET Elisabeth (UC-BERKELEY)
Utility, Risk, and Demand for Incomplete Insurance: Lab Experiments with Guatemalan Cooperatives
écrit avec Co-author(s) : Craig McIntosh and Felix Povell
We play a series of incentivized laboratory games with risk-exposed coffee farmers in Guatemala to understand the demand for index-based excess rainfall insurance. By varying risk in systematic ways over a large number of games, we can use numerical techniques to estimate explicit flexible utility functions for each player, and with these to simulate demand under alternate scenarios. We introduce the presence of the types of novel drought risks likely to be driven by global warming and find that these lead to sharp decreases in flood insurance demand, even when the objective benefit of the flood insurance is held constant. The possibility of using group-based mechanisms to smooth idiosyncratic risk is introduced by playing games with group-based products, and by asking farmers to anticipate and deliberate on the extent to which their groups would effectively smooth risk. Our results indicate that elevated weather-driven variance has very different effects if it occurs inside of insured or uninsured states, and that groups provide a very imperfect way of protecting farmers from these risks.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 13/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment B, 2e étage, Salle de Réunions
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 12/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
KOS Nenad (BOCCONI - MILAN)
Information in Tender Offers with a Large Shareholder.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/01/2015 de 12:00 à 13:00
MSE Room S19
DUSSAUX Damien (CERNA / MINES PARISTECH)
TBA
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 05/01/2015 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
ESÖ Peter (OXFORD UNIVERSITY)
Persuasion and Pricing
écrit avec Co-author : Chris Wallace (University of Leicester)