Calendrier du mois de janvier 2016
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 29/01/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
VELJANOSKA Stefanija (PSE)
Can land fragmentation reduce the exposure of rural households to weather variability?
RISK Working Group
Du 28/01/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
BOMMIER Antoine (ETH Zürich)
A dual approach to ambiguity aversion
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 28/01/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment E, Rez de chaussée, Salle 101
NAX Heinrich (ETH Zurich)
A behavioral study of « noise » in coordination games
écrit avec Michael Mäs
‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on ‘how noise matters’ for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%
) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity.
Economic History Seminar
Du 27/01/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
ZORINA KHAN ( Bowdoin College )
Related Investing: Corporate Ownership and the Dynamics of Capital Mobilization during Industrialization
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 26/01/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
GEORGIEFF Alexandre (PSE)
Employment protection and subjective well-being: Evidence from Germany
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 25/01/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
CHAMBERS Christopher (UCSD)
Benchmarking SALLE 10
écrit avec Alan D. Milleryz
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 25/01/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
HEINRICH Max ()
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 22/01/2016 de 12:15 à 13:45
FERRIèRE Axelle (PSE)
To give or not to give? How do other donors react to European food aid allocation?
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 22/01/2016 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital – Room B2.1) Paris 13
TINEL Bruno (Universite Paris 1 )
La dette Publique : Transferts entre générations ou rapports de classes ?
écrit avec Eric Monnet (Banque de France)
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 21/01/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
RIVERA Thomas (HEC)
Incentives and the Structure of Communication
This paper analyzes the incentives that arise within an organization when communication is restricted to a particular network structure (e.g., a hierarchy). We show that restricting communication between the principal and agents may create incentives for the agents to misbehave when transmitting information and tasks throughout the organization. Such incentives can render the principal's most preferred outcome infeasible and therefore introduces a trade off between the cost of communication borne by the principal and the benefit of curbing incentives to deviate induced by the communication structure. To remedy this issue, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the topology of the network of communication such that restricting communication to a particular network does not restrict the set of outcomes that the principal could otherwise achieve. In this sense, we show that for any underlying incentives and any outcome available when communication is unrestricted, there exists a (finite) communication scheme restricted to a particular network that implements this outcome (i.e., does not induce agents to misbehave in the communication phase) if and only if that network satisfies our conditions
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 20/01/2016 de 18:00 à 19:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
VILAIN Jean-Baptiste(*)
LOPEZ-KOLKOVSKY Rodrigo(*)
Estimating individual productivity in football
In most production settings, the collective output is observed while the individual productivity
of team members is difficult to assess. This often results in inefficiency in the labor
market : relatively to their individual productivity, some workers are overpaid while others are underpaid. Team sports are no exception and appear as a great laboratory to explore the question of estimating individual productivity in team settings. In this paper, we provide a measure of football players' productivity based on fixed-effects and shrinkage methods and we show that this estimation procedure is reliable. Thanks to this innovative measure, we are able to identify players who are undervalued on the market.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 20/01/2016 de 16:00 à 17:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
LAITIN David (STANFORD)
Language Policy and Human Development
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 20/01/2016 de 12:30 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
MACHIN Stephen (*)
Cybercrime and Moral Hazard: Evidence From Dark Web Drugs Markets
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 19/01/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
HILLION Mélina (Paris School of Economics)
The happy survivors: Teaching accreditation exams reveal grading biases systematically favor women in male-dominated disciplines
Discrimination is seen as one of the possible causes behind the underrepresentation of women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). However, existing experiments and studies find contrasting results. We hypothesize that these discrepancies are explained by strong variations in evaluation biases according to both the extent of underrepresentation of women in each STEM and non STEM subject and the level at which the evaluation takes place. This is tested using as natural experiments French competitive teaching exams in 11 different fields and at 3 different levels of qualification. Comparisons of oral non gender-blind tests with written gender-blind tests reveal a bias in favor of women that is strongly increasing with the extent of its male-domination. The bias turns from pro-male in literature and foreign languages to strongly pro-female in math, physics or philosophy. The phenomenon is strongest at the highest level, suggesting that discrimination does not impair hiring chances of female students in STEM fields at the very end of their curriculum, although it may do so at earlier stages (e.g. middle school, high school and college).
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 18/01/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 2
DILME Francesc (UNIVERSITY OF BONN)
Residual Deterrence
écrit avec Daniel F. Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics)
Industrial Organization
Du 18/01/2016 de 12:00 à 13:15
MIKLOS-THAL Jeanine (University of Rochester)
Resale Price Maintenance when Playing Favorites is Prohibited
écrit avec G. Shaffer
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 18/01/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
FAURE Matthieu (*)
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 14/01/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
BEHRINGER Stefan (*)
Public Good Provision with many Agents: The k-success technology
écrit avec Yukio Koriyama, Ecole Polytechnique
In this paper, we consider a class of public good provision problems in which the production function takes the form of k-success technology, an extension of the direct provision technology considered in Behringer (2013). These models are suitable to describe the free-rider problems in which there are a large number of agents who are both users and beneficiaries of a public good at the same time, e.g. open-source software or social networks. We provide results on asymptotic efficiency which connect a negative result of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and a positive result of Hellwig (2003), as well as a set of simple examples which allow us welfare comparison with the standard technologies.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 13/01/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
DUPAS Pascaline (STANFORD UNIVERSITY)
Targeting Experimentation Subsidies in Credit Constrained Environments
écrit avec Sylvain Chassang, Catlan Reardon and Erik Snowberg
For many technologies, the rate of return depends on local conditions. Therefore, local experimentation is needed for individuals to make technology adoption decisions. Given this public good aspect, experimentation needs to be subsidized. The premise of our study is that people are heterogeneous in their suitability as experimenters, and that the effectiveness of programs to promote experimentation can be enhanced by targeting the most appropriate experimenters. The key question is how to identify who are the most appropriate experimenters: is this information known from individuals themselves? from their network? If known, can it be elicited? We develop theoretically, implement and compare (through a field experiment with Kenyan farmers) three elicitation/selection mechanisms, based on the selective trials approach developed in Chassang et al. (2012).
Economic History Seminar
Du 13/01/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
GREEN Brett (WUSTL)
A very English institution? Foreign influences and the poor law.
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 12/01/2016 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Siences économiques, salle du 6ème étage (106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris)
DOCQUIER Frédéric (LISER)
The Welfare Impact of Global Migration in OECD Countries
écrit avec A. Aubry & M. Burzynski
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 12/01/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
WREN-LEWIS Liam (PSE)
The impact of school peers on interracial adult relationships
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 11/01/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
KLIMM Max ()
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 08/01/2016 de 12:15 à 13:45
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 05/01/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
POULHES Mathilde (Sciences Po)
Are Enterprise Zones Benefi ts 'Capitalized' into Commercial "Property Values"? The French case