Calendrier du mois de janvier 2020
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 31/01/2020 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE, Salle 19 (Nouveau Bât.) 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris
TADJEDDINE YAMINA Yamina (Université de Lorraine, BETA)
La diversité des capitalismes financiers, le cas des Fusions-Acquisitions en France
écrit avec Sylvain Thine (CESSP-EHESS)
Les opérations de fusions acquisitions sont des moments particuliers sur le marché du capital car elles finalisent un arrangement marchand: le capital d’une PME ou la filiale d’un groupe qui n’existait pas en tant qu’objet échangeable librement sur un marché, se trouve doter de qualités marchandes, d’une valeur financière et fait l’objet d’un achat. Observer ces opérations permet de comprendre comment le capital d’une entreprise devient un objet financier. Pour aborder empiriquement le secteur des fusions-acquisitions, nous avons travaillé sur la base CARFI qui a recensé 363 opérations de FUSAC en 2010 en France. Nous avons complété cette base en ajoutant le niveau des organisations financières. Nous avons mené une ACM qui nous a permis de distinguer trois régimes financiers : le capitalisme bancaire impliquant les banques européennes, le capitalisme financier lié à la présence de banques d’investissement américaines et le capitalisme financier d’entreprise associé à des conseillers indépendants.
La discussion sera introduite par Thibault DARCILLON (U. Paris 8)
Behavior Working Group
Du 30/01/2020 de 10:30 à 11:30
R2-20
MUN Soffia (PSE)
Econometric estimation of Prospect Theory for Natural Ambiguity
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 28/01/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GUILLOUZOUIC Arthur (IPP)
Follow the money! Combining household and firm-level evidence to untangle the tax-elasticity of dividends
écrit avec Laurent Bach, Antoine Bozio, Brice Fabre, Claire Leroy et Clément Malgouyres.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 27/01/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
MERTIKOPOULOS Panayotis ()
*
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 22/01/2020 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MOLTENI Marco (University of Oxford)
Financial deepening gone wrong? Italian banking crises in 1926-36: determinants of distress
Economic History Seminar
Du 22/01/2020 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
KORCHMINA Elena (NYUAD)
Peer Pressure: The Puzzle of Tax Compliance in the Early Nineteenth-Century Russia
How can developing countries successfully implement income taxes, which are generally desirable but costly to collect? This paper analyzes the income tax compliance of elites in a developing country with a low administrative capacity, drawing attention to the role of either voluntary or quasi-voluntary components of tax acquiescence. In 1812, the Russian government introduced the progressive income tax, with the highest tax rate of 10 per cent. After Britain, the Russian Empire became the second country to adopt this levy—under the threat of Napoleonic invasion. Unlike the widely known and deeply investigated British case, the history of the Russian income tax suffers from a lack of detailed research. I use a self-compiled unique dataset for estimating the level of tax compliance of the Russian noble elite at the individual level. The dataset is based on the self-reported tax returns of approximately 4,000 Russian aristocrats who had real estate in the Moscow region. Using narrative sources and crosschecking with official bank documents, I reveal not only that the Russian nobility declared reliable income information but also that the share of aristocratic evaders was relatively low (from 30 to 10 per cent). I argue that this surprisingly high level of tax compliance was achieved through a unique mechanism of tax collection involving the channels of social sanctioning and group identity, boosted by the national threat of Napoleonic invasion. This case could be considered as extremely important, insofar as the state could not achieve its fiscal aims due to coercive tools in the hands of bureaucracy but had to rely on consensus with elite.
Du 21/01/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
WREN-LEWIS Liam(PSE)
WREN-LEWIS Liam(PSE)
BERTOLI Simone(Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, IZA, ICM)
BERTOLI Simone(Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, IZA, ICM)
LOCHMANN Alexia(PSE)
LOCHMANN Alexia(PSE)
STERN Lennart(PSE)
GOVIND Yajna(PSE, WID)
FROMENTIN Julie(Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne, INED, ICM)
SOLIGNAC Matthieu(Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Comptrasec ; Ined; ICM)
SOLIGNAC Matthieu(Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Comptrasec ; Ined; ICM)
TOMA Sorana(ENSAE, ICM)
TOMA Sorana(ENSAE, ICM)
TBD
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 21/01/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
GHOSH Rajarshi (ESSEC)
Identity and Preferences: What do our Choices really reflect?
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 21/01/2020 de 15:30 à 19:00
Campus Condorcet, Centre de Colloques, Salle 3.03
BERTOLI Simone(Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, IZA, ICM)
LOCHMANN Alexia(PSE)
SOLIGNAC Matthieu(Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Comptrasec ; Ined; ICM)
TOMA Sorana(ENSAE, ICM)
WREN-LEWIS LIAM Liam(PSE/INRA, ICM)
*
Texte intégral
Du 21/01/2020 de 15:00 à 19:00
Campus Condorcet, Centre de Colloques, Salle 3.03
WREN-LEWIS Liam(PSE)
WREN-LEWIS Liam(PSE)
BERTOLI Simone(Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, IZA, ICM)
BERTOLI Simone(Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, IZA, ICM)
LOCHMANN Alexia(PSE)
LOCHMANN Alexia(PSE)
STERN Lennart(PSE)
GOVIND Yajna(PSE, WID)
FROMENTIN Julie(Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne, INED, ICM)
SOLIGNAC Matthieu(Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Comptrasec ; Ined; ICM)
SOLIGNAC Matthieu(Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Comptrasec ; Ined; ICM)
TOMA Sorana(ENSAE, ICM)
TOMA Sorana(ENSAE, ICM)
*
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 21/01/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOVIND Yajna (PSE, WID)
Naturalisation: Passport to better labour market performances? Evidence from mixed marriages in France
Better integration is beneficial for migrants and the host country. In this respect, granting citizenship is deemed to be an important policy to boost migrants’ integration. In this paper, I estimate the causal impact of obtaining citizenship on migrants’ labor market integration. I exploit a change in the law of naturalization through marriage in France in 2006. This reform amended the eligibility criteria of applicants by increasing the required number of years of marital life from 2 to 4, providing a quasi-experimental setting. Using administrative panel data, I first show evidence of the impact of the reform on the naturalization rates. I then use a dynamic triple-differences model to estimate the labor market returns to naturalization. I find that citizenship leads to increased labor market participation. Among those working, it leads to higher overall earnings associated with both an increased number of hours worked and higher hourly wages. A gender decomposition shows that the effect on the increased probability of working is more relevant for men. On the other hand, among those working, women tend to be the ones benefiting from higher overall earnings as a result of an increased number of hours and hourly wages.
Du 21/01/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WREN-LEWIS Liam(PSE)
WREN-LEWIS Liam(PSE)
BERTOLI Simone(Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, IZA, ICM)
BERTOLI Simone(Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, CERDI, IZA, ICM)
LOCHMANN Alexia(PSE)
LOCHMANN Alexia(PSE)
STERN Lennart(PSE)
GOVIND Yajna(PSE, WID)
FROMENTIN Julie(Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne, INED, ICM)
SOLIGNAC Matthieu(Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Comptrasec ; Ined; ICM)
SOLIGNAC Matthieu(Université de Bordeaux, CNRS, Comptrasec ; Ined; ICM)
TOMA Sorana(ENSAE, ICM)
TOMA Sorana(ENSAE, ICM)
Funding Global Public Good Institutions via taxes on aviation emissions- a comparison of three proposed mechanisms
The EU is considering taking unilateral action to achieve higher carbon pricing for international aviation. It has been proposed that the EU could start a club mechanism whereby participating countries would have to tax at a fixed rate the emissions of all outgoing flights as well as all flights coming in from non-participants. They would then have to allocate a certain proportion of the tax revenue to some agreed-upon global institution for climate change mitigation. I propose an alternative club mechanism in which participating countries could allocate their tax revenue to Global Public Good Institutions (GPGIs) of their choice from a set GPGIs recognised as eligible in the treaty establishing the mechanism. Of the tax revenue that participants decide to not allocate, they could retain a fixed proportion. The remaining revenue would be added to the GPGIs in proportion to the aggregate allocations made to them. I consider an example where the set of eligible GPGIs consists of 2 GPGIs for global health and 4 for climate change mitigation. I estimate the payoffs that countries would derive from money being added to the different GPGIs,taking into account the heteogrenous benefits generated by each GPGI, the rents that some GPGIs create and the redistributional effects that some GPGIs induce by changing e.g. the oil price. Using an iterated best response algorithm and assuming that initially only the EU and China participate, I predict that this new mechanism can achieve 22% more welfare gains than the previously proposed one, raising 50% more revenue for GPGIs. I then enrich the mechanism by allowing countries to also give to so called “proportional matching funds”, which distribute their budget to subsets of GPGIs, in proportion to the direct allocations made to these GPGIs. This enriched mechanism can achieve 67% more welfare gains than the previously proposed one, raising 100% more revenue for GPGIs.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 20/01/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
MATYSKOVA Ludmila ()
*
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 14/01/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
NAVARRETE H. Nicolas (Paris School of Economics )
Behind the Veil: the Effect of Banning the Islamic Veil in School
Immigration from Muslim countries is a source of tensions in many Western countries. Several countries have adopted regulations restricting religious expression and emphasizing the neutrality of the public sphere. We explore the effect of the most emblematic of these regulations: the prohibition of Islamic veils in French schools. In September 1994, a circular from the French Ministry of Education asked teachers and principals to ban Islamic veils in public schools. In March 2004, the parliament took one-step further and enshrined prohibition in law. This paper provides evidence that the 1994 circular contributed to improving the educational outcomes of female students with a Muslim background and to reducing educational inequalities between Muslim and non-Muslim students. We also provide evidence suggesting that the 2004 law has not generated any further improvements.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 13/01/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
GAUJAL Bruno ()
*
Behavior seminar
Du 09/01/2020 de 10:30 à 11:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
BORING Anne (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Reducing Discrimination in the Field: Evidence from an Awareness Raising Intervention Targeting Gender Biases in Student Evaluations of Teaching
écrit avec Arnaud Philippe
This paper presents the results of a field experiment designed to reduce gender discrimination in student evaluations of teaching (SET). In the first intervention, students receive a normative statement reminding them that they should not discriminate in SETs. In the second intervention, the normative statement includes precise information about how other students (especially male students) have discriminated against female teachers in previous years. The purely normative statement has no significant impact on SET overall satisfaction scores, suggesting that a blanket awareness-raising campaign may be inefficient to reduce discrimination. However, the informational statement appears to significantly reduce gender discrimination. The effect we find mainly comes from a change in male students’ evaluation of female teachers.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 08/01/2020 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 07/01/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BERGERON Augustin (Harvard University)
Local Elites as Tax Collectors: Experimental Evidence from the DRC
Historical states with low capacity often empowered local elites to collect taxes, despite the risk of mismanagement. Could local tax collection raise revenues without undermining government legitimacy in fragile states today? We provide evidence from a field experiment in which the Provincial Government of Kasai Central, in the DR Congo, randomly assigned city neighborhoods to centralized property tax collection, conducted by agents of the tax ministry, or local tax collection, conducted by neighborhood chiefs. Local collection generated 30% higher revenues and 24% lower transaction costs compared to central collection. Although there is evidence of a small increase in bribes, local collection did not undermine citizens’ views of the government; in fact, it increased reported confidence in the formal state. Hybrid treatment arms and survey evidence suggest that local chiefs achieved higher citizen tax compliance because of their informational advantages rather than a differential ability to threaten sanctions, to make salient the public-goods-tax link, or to motivate tax morale.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 06/01/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PARK In-Uck (University of Bristol)
Towards a Simple Model of Continuous-Time Games
écrit avec Siyang Xiong