Calendrier du mois de octobre 2019
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 30/10/2019 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
Economic History Seminar
Du 30/10/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MC CANTS Anne (MIT)
Polygamy, the Commodification of Women, and the Erosion of Trust
écrit avec Dan Seligson (MIT)
Family systems shape social institutions, yet they are rarely considered in histories of economic development. In this paper, we show how market forces act through the dichotomy of polygamy and monogamy, mirroring them in a syndrome of social conventions such as age at marriage, bride price, sequestration, and discrimination and violence against women. We argue that this syndrome, which we call polygamos and which we quantify by two different methods, has demonstrable consequences for the development of economic and institutional well-being.
Texte intégral
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 29/10/2019 de 17:00 à 18:00
CASANUEVA ARTIS Annalí ()
The effects of Black Lives Matter
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 29/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BLANCHET Thomas ()
Modelling the Dynamics of Wealth Inequality in the United States: 1962–2100
I decompose the dynamics of the wealth distribution using a simple dynamic stochastic model that separates the effects of consumption, labor income, rates of return, growth, demographics and inheritance. Based on two results of stochastic calculus, I show that this model is nonparametrically identified and can be estimated using only repeated cross-sections of the data. I estimate it using distributional national accounts for the United States since 1962. I find that, out of the 15 pp. increase in the top 1% wealth share observed since 1980, about 7 pp. can be attributed to rising labor income inequality, 6 pp. to rising returns on wealth (mostly in the form of capital gains), and 2 pp. to lower growth. Under current parameters, the top 1% wealth share would reach its steady-state value of roughly 45% by the 2040s, a level similar to that of the beginning of the 20th century. These conclusions apply to a wide class of models of the wealth distribution, regardless of the specific ways in which they model, say, consumption or the labor market.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 25/10/2019 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.01, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
POULIQUEN Victor (PSE)
Firm Formalization and Intra-Household Relationships: Experimental Evidence from Benin
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 24/10/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
KOLLMANN Robert (Université de Bruxelles)
Stationary Rational Bubbles in Non-Linear Business Cycle Models
This paper shows that stationary sunspot equilibria can exist in standard non-linear DSGE models, even when the linearized versions of those models have a unique solution. Thus, those non-linear models can exhibit stationary fluctuations, even if there are no shocks to productivity, preferences of other ‘fundamentals’. In the sunspot equilibria considered here, the economy may temporarily diverge from the no-sunspots trajectory, before abruptly reverting towards that trajectory. In contrast to rational bubbles in linear models (Blanchard (1979)), the rational bubbles considered here are stationary--their path does not explode. Numerical simulations suggest that non-linear DSGE models driven solely by stationary bubbles can generate persistent fluctuations of real activity and capture key business cycle stylized facts.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 24/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
GHERSENGORIN Alexis (Oxford)
Revealed Preference Formation
écrit avec N. Boissonnet and S. Gleyze
We propose a theory of preference formation together with conditions on choice
data that identify our model. We introduce non-behavioral objects which causes DM’s
preferences and we describe how DM can rationally act on these causes. Our contribution
is to provide rigorous and testable foundations for building theories of endogenous
preferences, evolving attention, etc. Specifically, we consider a model of
reason-based choice in which DM’s behavior is motivated by some properties she
thinks are relevant for decision making. Alternatives are compared with respect to
how well their properties satisfy DM’s motivations. Preferences are evolving because
whenever she becomes aware of a set of properties, DM can decide to make them relevant
or irrelevant for her future choices. We identify when this decision is based on
the maximization of a meta-preference, implying that preference formation is deliberate.
We resolve the underdetermination associated with (deterministic) theories of
reason-based choice by exploiting the intertemporal structure of preference changes.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 24/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
HILLION Mélina (Paris School of Economics)
How school context and management influence sick leave and teacher departure
Many studies show that management practices and the work environment contribute to corporate and state performance. However, their impact on workers' behavior and health has received little attention so far. A better understanding of their role could help designing appropriate measures to reduce absenteeism from work and health care expenditures. In this paper, I exploit a unique matched employer-employee dataset that contains all the absence episodes of secondary school teachers in France over the period 2006-2016. I take advantage of the mobility of teachers and school principals between schools to decompose teacher absences into individual, work-related and residual contributions. I classify schools and principals into quartiles according to the values of their estimated fixed effect on absenteeism. I find that the absence duration of teachers is multiplied by 3 (an increase of about 8 days per year) on average between the first and fourth quartile of school effects on absenteeism, and multiplied by 2.4 (an increase of about 6 days per year) on average between the first and fourth quartile of school principal effects on absenteeism. I find that teacher turnover increases for schools (respectively principals) that increase absenteeism, and that teachers are even more likely to leave these schools (respectively principals) if they are more absent than their colleagues. Then, I examine a subsample of schools matched to the 2013 and 2016 working conditions surveys. I find that school effects on absenteeism are positively correlated with work intensity and hostile behaviors, while school principal effects on absenteeism are negatively correlated with hierarchical support. Finally, school effects on absenteeism are negatively associated with teachers' psychological well-being as measured by the WHO-5 index.
Economic History Seminar
Du 23/10/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
POMPERMAIER Matteo (GRHis)
The ‘Handkerchief Economy’: Inns and Bastioni as Microcredit Institutions in Early Modern Venice (18th century).
In early modern Venice, wine and money were intrinsically linked through the activity of the innkeepers and the bastioneri (the managers of the bastioni, warehouses where wine was sold), who offered their customers an innovative pawnbroking service. They assumed the double roles of suppliers of basic goods and creditors, thereby becoming central economic figures in Venice’s urban context – especially for the members of the poorest classes. One of the most innovative elements of this credit circuit lies in the way that interest on loans was collected: creditors benefited from the fact that one-third of the total value of the transaction was paid in wine. The low average value of the loans confirms that this service was mainly aimed at the lower classes of society, the main actors in what has been defined as ‘the handkerchief economy’. Those who benefited the most from this kind of credit arrangement were essentially poor – but not ‘too poor’ – people, who had only modest reserves of money, and were thus more vulnerable due to the paucity and irregularity of their income.
This paper focuses on the pawnbroking activity of Venetian innkeepers and bastioneri, with a twofold main objective: (a) to describe his origins and mode of operation and (b) to highlight his social and economic impact on 18th century Venice.
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 22/10/2019 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Paris 1, 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris (M° Campo-Formio), salle du 6ème
VILLEGAS SANCHEZ Carolina (ESADE, Barcelone)
Foreign Investment and Domestic Productivity: Identifying Knowledge Spillovers and Competition Effects
écrit avec Christian Fons-Rosen, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent E. Sorensen, Vadym Volosovych
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 22/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MEHMOOD Sultan ()
Judicial Independence and Development: Evidence from Pakistan
To what extent does the Presidential appointment of judges impact judicial decision making? This paper provides causal evidence that the institution of Presidential appointment exerts considerable influence on judicial decision making in Pakistan. We find that a change in selection procedure of judges from Presidential appointment to appointment by a judicial commission (consisting of peer judges) significantly reduces rulings in favor of the government and that this reduction reflects an improvement in the quality of judicial decisions. Using mandatory retirement age as an instrument for new appointments allows us to estimate the causal effect of the reform. We test for, and provide evidence against, potential threats to identification and alternative explanations to our findings. The analysis of case content reveals that the results are explained by rulings in politically salient cases. We find evidence of selection effects mechanism: judges appointed by the President are more likely to have been politically active prior to their appointment. We also find a positive welfare effect of the reform, with lower expropriation risk leading to increased investment in the construction industry and higher house prices.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 21/10/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
RUIZ Celia (PSE)
Agglomeration, Transport and Productivity: Evidence from Toulouse Metropolitan Area
Economic activity tends to be highly concentrated. These agglomeration or concentration forms are driven by spatial externalities on productivity, and are named agglomeration externalities. Transport improvements - by reducing the interaction cost between economic agents placed in different locations - can extend the geographic scope of these externalities on productivity. Furthermore, transport exposure also affects productivity directly as it may bring firm and employee relocations by making some places more attractive than others. Therefore, the objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to estimate the extent of agglomeration externalities at the urban scale, and secondly, to estimate the - direct and indirect - impact of transport exposure on productivity, using very fine georeferenced data on the road and public transport networks, and on more than one million employees working in a number of heterogeneous zones within Toulouse metropolitan area. This constitutes a valuable input for an urban planner who wants to maximize city’s wealth by identifying the disaggregated productivity impact of new transport infrastructure. To achieve these goals, we first estimate productivity effects of agglomeration and transport measures implementing a wage determination model using very disaggregated and georeferenced data of a sample of employees working in Toulouse in 2013 and 2015. We perform a two stage estimation approach (Combes et al. (2008)). The first stage of the regression allows us to assess the importance of industry effects and sector concentration characteristics against those highlighting true productivity differences across zones. In the second stage of the regression, we explain those productivity differences across zones - represented by the estimated first stage’s area-year fixed effects – by our local factors of interest: local employment density, and local transport exposure measures. Finally, and to have a full representation of transport impacts, we investigate the effect of transport exposure on local employment density. Our results suggest that out transport exposure measures have a substantial and significant effect on local productivity and local employment density.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 18/10/2019 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.01, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MOLINA MILLAN Teresa (Nova School of Business and Economics and Novafrica)
Incentivizing CHWs in Guinea-Bissau: Experimental Evidence on Social Status and Intrinsic Motivation
écrit avec Mattia Fracchia and Pedro Vicente
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 18/10/2019 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE, Salle 18 (nouveau Bât) 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris
LINDVALL Johannes (U.Lind)
Unions and Migrant Rights in the Long Run
écrit avec Frida Boräng, Sara Kalm
We use historical data on union density and new historical data on the egal status of resident migrants to study the long-run relationship between the strength of trade unions and the social rights of migrants in Western Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region. In countries with strong trade unions, there was, for a long time, a widening gap between the rights of migrants and the rights of natives, since the rights of citizens expanded sooner and more quickly than the rights of migrants. Over time, however, the difference between countries with strong and weak unions have diminished, and in more
recent times, the “rights gap” between citizens and migrants has in fact been smaller in countries with strong unions than in countries with weak unions.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 17/10/2019 de 16:30 à 18:00
() TBA;
La séance est annulée
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 17/10/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-02
GUNER Nezih (UAB, CEMFI)
Training, Offshoring and the Job Ladder
écrit avec Alessandro Ruggieri and James Tybout
Over the past 30 years, skill premiums have grown, jobs in the middle of the skill distribution have become relatively scarce, and job and worker turnover rates have declined. At the same time, the fraction of the population attending college has grown, much of the manufacturing work force has shifted into services, and employers' investments in on-the-job training have increasingly favored high-skilled workers. This paper
interprets these patterns through the lens of a dynamic structural model that explains workers' human capital accumulation, unemployment spells, and earnings trajectories over their life cycles. Offshoring and import competition shift job creation away from trade-exposed occupations, thereby changing job offer arrival rates for each worker type, increasing incentives to invest in college degrees, and shifting patterns of employers' investments in on-the-job training. A quantitative example shows the model can replicate observed changes in U.S. labor markets.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 17/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:45
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-02
URZUA Sergio (University of Maryland)
Shooting Stars? Firms and Education as Mediators of the Returns to Skills
écrit avec Co-author: F. Saltiel
In the context of skill-biased technological change, understanding the nature and the mechanisms through which skills result in improved labor market outcomes is of critical importance. In this paper, we take advantage of three administrative data sources to estimate the labor market returns to skills in the labor market. We first test for non-linearities in these returns and find that the returns to mathematical skills are highly non-linear, with math skill ’superstars’ far outearning other high math scorers. Meanwhile, the returns to language skills are largely flat through the early career. We find that high math-skilled workers not only complete more years of education, but graduate from higher quality universities and earn higher-paying degrees. We further examine the role of firms as a mediator of the returns to skills, a dimension not previously explored in the literature. We find that high-skilled workers match to high-paying firms immediately upon labor market entry. We conduct a decomposition to examine the separate contribution of education and firms in mediating the returns to skills, and find that worker-firm matching explains almost half of the estimated returns.
PSE Internal Seminar
Du 17/10/2019 de 12:00 à 13:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
We present the preliminary results from a lab experiment investigating how economic inequality and network structure affect public good provision. We frame the experiment as a local public good game: in the lab, subjects are assigned a network position, and an endowment to be split between a private good and a public good that benefits direct neighbors as well. Our aim is to test the behavioral validity of the equilibrium predictions, and whether subjects are able to coordinate away from equilibrium to maximize welfare.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 16/10/2019 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
GRANDI Elisa (PSE)
ATELIER DFIH : Elisa Grandi sur les réseaux
Du 16/10/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.13, Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 15/10/2019 de 17:00 à 18:00
VANNIER Brendan ()
Dark clouds hanging over economic activity: Novel elements for a typology of crisis, discontinuities and volatility
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 15/10/2019 de 16:30 à 19:00
PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, Salle R1-09
BATISTA Catia(Nova School of Business and Economics.)
TURATI Riccardo (UCLouvain)
Testing Classic Theories of Migration in the Lab
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 15/10/2019 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Paris 1, 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris (M° Campo-Formio), salle du 6ème
GROSSMAN Gene (Princeton)
The 'New' Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence?
écrit avec Phillip McCalman, and Robert W. Staiger
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 15/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CARPETTINI Bruno (University of Zurich )
The electoral impact of wealth redistribution: Evidence from the Italian land reform
écrit avec Lorenzo Casaburi
Governments often implement large-scale redistribution policies to gain political support. However, little is known on whether such policies generate sizable gains, whether these gains are persistent, and why. We study the political consequences of a major land redistribution program in Italy. Using a panel spatial regression discontinuity design, we show that the reform generated large electoral gains for the incumbent Christian Democratic party, and similarly large losses for the Communist party. The electoral effects persist over four decades, during a period in which the agricultural sector shrank dramatically. We explore several mechanisms for this persistence. Analysis of fiscal transfers, public sector employment, and referendum outcomes suggests that the reform initiated a repeated exchange: the incumbent party continued promoting the interests of treated towns even after the land redistribution ended and the voters continued supporting this party. Additional analysis finds less support for other potential mechanisms, including voters' long-term memory, changes in voters' beliefs, and mechanical correlation in voting over time.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 14/10/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PUPPE Clemens (Karlsruhe Institute for Technology)
Resource Allocation by Frugal Majority Rule
écrit avec Klaus Nehrig
We propose a model of ‘frugal aggregation’ in which the evaluation of social welfare must be based on information about agents’ top choices plus general qualitative background conditions on preferences. The former is elicited individually, while the latter is not. We apply this model to problems of public budget allocation, relying on the specific assumption of separable and convex preferences. We propose and analyze a particularly aggregation rule called ‘Frugal Majority Rule.’ It is defined in terms of a suitably localized net majority relation. This relation is shown to be consistent, i.e. acyclic and decisive; its maxima minimize the sum of the natural resource distances to the individual tops. As a consequence of this result, we argue that the Condorcet and Borda perspectives – which conflict in the standard, ordinal setting – converge here. The second main result provides a crisp algorithmic characterization that renders the Frugal Majority Rule analytically tractable and efficiently computable.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 14/10/2019 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle 116) 75013 Paris
LEQUIEN Matthieu (Banque de France-PSE-Insee)
The Heterogeneous Impact of Market Size on Innovation: Evidence from French Firm-Level Exports
écrit avec Philippe Aghion (College de France-LSE), Antonin Bergeaud (Banque de France-PSE) and Marc Melitz (Harvard)
We analyze how demand conditions faced by a firm impacts its innovation decisions. To disentangle the direction of causality between innovation and demand conditions, we construct a firm-level export demand shock which responds to aggregate conditions in a firm's export destinations but is exogenous to firm-level decisions. Using exhaustive data covering the French manufacturing sector, we show that French firms respond to exogenous growth shocks in their export destinations by patenting more; and that this response is entirely driven by the subset of initially more productive firms. The patent response arises 3 to 5 years after a demand shock, highlighting the time required to innovate. In contrast, the demand shock raises contemporaneous sales and employment for all firms, without any notable differences between high and low productivity firms. We show that this finding of a skewed innovation response to common demand shocks arises naturally from a model of endogenous innovation and competition with firm heterogeneity. The market size increase drives all firms to innovate more by increasing the innovation rents; yet by inducing more entry and thus more competition, it also discourages innovation by low productivity firms.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 14/10/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
NEWMAN Andy (Boston University)
Competing for a Quiet Life: An Organizational Theory of Market Structure
écrit avec Patrick Legros, Zsolt Udvari
We develop a property-rights model of endogenous market structure in
which contracting imperfections, rather than scale economies, emerge as the
source of market power. Production of a homogenous good is carried out
by substitutable, incentive-constrained teams that can stand alone as
perfect competitors or sell their assets to profit-motivated HQs, thereby
becoming subordinate members of their firms. HQs subsequently Cournot
compete in the product market. Team output and costs aggregate linearly
within and across firms, there are no diseconomies of HQ ownership, and HQs
are abundant.
A fundamental hold-out problem places lower and upper bounds on the
degree of concentration. The equilibrium market structure is typically an
oligopoly, sometimes with a competitive fringe. Concentration may increase
with the size of the market, unlike in the standard Cournot entry model.
Entry barriers and competition policy may have distinct effects depending
on the demand regime, which has implications for optimal policy in rich vs.
developing countries.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 11/10/2019 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.01, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LEHNE Jonathan (PSE)
Irrigation vs Education: The long-run effects of opium cultivation in British India
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 10/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
GARRIGA Santiago (Paris School of Economics)
Incidence and wage effects of means-tested transfers: Evidence from a change in the payment system
This paper explores whether the way in which means-tested transfers are paid has any effect on employer’s behavior, wages, and employment. We exploit a change in the payment system that was gradually rolled out between 2003 and 2010 in Argentina. Under the old system, employers were intermediaries that paid family allowances to their employees together with their corresponding salary, and they were allowed to deduct this transfer from employer social security contributions. The new system eliminated the intermediary role played by employers and centralized the payments in a government agency that started disbursing the allowances directly to eligible workers. Using employer-employee micro-data and an event-study design, we show that the way tax credits are disbursed is not neutral. Our evidence suggests that, under the old system, employers shift part of the incidence of the transfer by paying lower wages. This result is in line with recent literature in public finance that calls into question the standard incidence model.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 10/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
WANG Olivier (NYU Stern)
Decision Making under Time Pressure
This paper studies individual decision making when deadlines are random. Since the quality of any decision relies on information and it takes time to gather information, a decision maker should have a preference over deadlines as well as over menus. Past research studies rationally inattentive decision making without deadlines. It is established that a decision maker’s informational constraint is revealed by her distaste for contingent planning. This paper extends the analysis to random deadlines and establishes the relationship between a decision maker’s preference over timed choice problems and the set of information acquisition paths she has available. It is demonstrated that if a decision maker’s preference over random deadlines satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom, then it is as if the decision maker’s optimal way to acquire information depends only on the menu she is presented with and is independent of the deadline. Moreover, if no information is lost along any path then the decision maker’s distaste for contingent planning becomes weaker as she is allowed more time to decide.
Behavior seminar
Du 10/10/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
DASKALOVA Vessela (IAST Toulouse)
Discrimination in Collective Decisions
This paper presents a model of discrimination in collective decisions. The focus is on the role of the institutional set-up for whether discrimination is mitigated or exacerbated. In particular, I consider the interaction of committee composition - homogeneous versus diverse with the decision making rule - unanimity versus majority voting. The analysis suggests that under uncertainty about the extent of the other decision makers' biases diversity in committees may help avoid own group favoritism. In homogeneous committees unanimity rule is more conducive to discrimination than majority rule.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 10/10/2019
Economic History Seminar
Du 09/10/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.13, Campus Jourdan 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
RIDOLFI Leonardo (University of Siena)
Six Centuries of Real Wages in France from Louis IX to Napoleon III: 1250–1860
Evidence of an early modern “Little divergence” in real wages between northwestern Europe and the rest of the continent is mostly based on the comparative study of a sample of leading European cities. Focusing on France and England this study reassesses the debate from a country-level perspective. The findings challenge the notion of an early modern “Little divergence” showing no clear-cut trend of divergence until the second half of the eighteenth century. Results also suggest that the real wages of a significant share of the French male labor force were broadly on par with the levels prevailing in England before c.1750.
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 08/10/2019 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Paris 1, 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris (M° Campo-Formio), salle du 6ème
BUSTOS Paula (CEMFI)
Capital Accumulation and Structural Transformation
écrit avec G. Garber and J. Ponticelli
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 08/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SIDOIS Charles-Louis (Mannheim )
Silence the Media or the Story? Theory and Evidence of Media capture.
écrit avec Elisa Mougin (Sciences-Po)
We explore a theory of media capture where a principal can either influence journalistic investigation (internal capture) or let the media investigate and pay to suppress news stories before publication (external capture). We predict that the likelihood of internal capture increases with perceived corruption while competition on the media market favors external capture. Exploiting new individual survey data from Reporters Without Borders, we use the revelation of the Panama Papers in 2016 as a shock to perceived corruption. With a differences-in-differences identification strategy that exploits the cross-country variation in exposure to the shock, we show that internal capture increases with perceived corruption.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 07/10/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PEREGO Jacopo (Columbia)
Belief Meddling in Social Networks: an Information-Design Approach
écrit avec Simone Galperti
Social media have become an increasingly important source of information about political, social and economic issues. While beneficial on many levels, the decentralized nature of these media may expose societies to novel risks of manipulation by third parties. To evaluate these risks, we study a model where a designer sends information to agents who interact in a game, so as to affect its outcome. The designer can communicate only with a limited number of agents, who then share information with each other on a network of social links before playing the game. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can be induced by seeding this social network with information. Our main result recasts this constrained information-design problem in terms of an equivalent linear program, which is particularly useful for applications. We show that a simple property of the network---the depth of communication---fully determines the scope for belief manipulation. Finally, we illustrate how a holistic use of linear-programming duality helps to characterize the solution to the optimal seeding problem. Our theory offers insights into the design of advertisement and political campaigns that are robust to (or leverage on) information spillovers.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 07/10/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LISKI Matti (Aalto University)
Do consumers gain when new technologies improve the efficiency of goods trade?
écrit avec Ivo Vehviläinen
This paper points out the basic price theory predictions for the consumer welfare gain from new technologies that improve the efficiency of goods trade. Micro-data on over 140 million of bids from three electricity markets reveals strikingly different consumer welfare impacts from new technologies. Consistent with the theory, the results can be explained by structural differences in excess demand: its convexity (concavity) is a determinant of consumers’ gain (loss).
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 03/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
COLO Philippe (PSE)
Advising against inefficiency
I examine a setting where two imperfectly informed senders use cheap talk communication to sequentially advise receivers taking part to a game of contribution to a public bad. The first sender aims at maximising social welfare, the second at increasing inefficiency. Because the receivers' game is inefficient, the first sender is biased towards the outcome of the receivers' game. I show that no truthful revelation is possible and that the second sender always lowers social welfare. In particular, because of the second sender, the first sender can be better off not maximising information transmission.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 03/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
LUKSIC Juan Diego (PSE)
Can immigration affect human capital mobility? Lessons from the recent migratory wave in Chile.
I estimate how immigrants can affect the causal relation of place on human capital mobility. I first study whether the place has a role in the test score that a primary student can achieve by studying movers across municipalities. Exploiting variation in the grade at which each child moves, I observe that students converge to the place to which they move linearly. On average, moving students converge - considering convergence as the reduction of the gap between the stayers from the origin versus destination - at approximately a rate of 10% per year. Then, I evaluate whether these results can be led by confounders by running different overidentification tests. These findings provide the basis for estimating the place effect of each municipality. Finally, I evaluate whether the role of place on human capital mobility change over time with the arrival of new immigrants.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 03/10/2019
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 02/10/2019 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
VERDICKT Gertjan(Anvers)
VERDICKT Gertjan(Anvers)
Go Active or Stay Passive: Investment Trusts, Financial Innovation and Diversification in an Emerging Market”
écrit avec with Jan Annaert
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 02/10/2019 de 17:00 à 19:30
VERDICKT Gertjan(Anvers)
VERDICKT Gertjan(Anvers)
Go Active or Stay Passive: Investment Trusts, Financial Innovation and Diversification in an Emerging Market
Development Economics Seminar
Du 02/10/2019 de 14:00 à 15:30
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
BREZA Emily (Harvard University)
LABOR RATIONING: A REVEALED PREFERENCE APPROACH FROM HIRING SHOCKS
écrit avec Supreet KAUR and Yogita SHAMDASANI
Assessing unemployment levels is empirically challenging. Economists currently rely on survey self-reports, whose reliability is unknown and which make it difficult to disentangle those who have exited the labor force and the self-employed from rationed workers. In this paper, we develop an approach to obtain the first revealed preference estimates of labor rationing. We generate large transitory hiring shocks in Indian local labor markets — hiring up to 35% of the male labor force for month-long work in external factories. We examine the impact of these transitory shocks on the local labor market to diagnose the extent of rationing. We find evidence for severe labor rationing during lean seasons, which account for 6 months of the year.
Specifically, “removing” a large portion of workers leads to (i) no change in the local wage, and (ii) no change in local aggregate employment levels (excluding our exter- nal jobs); this is due to one-for-one positive employment spillovers on the remaining workers who benefit from decreased competition for job slots. We further decompose rationing into involuntary unemployment and disguised unemployment (self-employed workers who would prefer wage labor). In contrast, we detect limited evidence for labor rationing during peak employment seasons: in these months, transitory exter- nal hiring shocks increase local wages and reduce local aggregate employment. In addition, we show that traditional government surveys substantively underestimate unemployment in this setting. This approach can be extended to obtain revealed preference bounds on involuntary unemployment in diverse settings.
Economic History Seminar
Du 02/10/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014
HOFFMAN Philip(Caltech)
POSTEL-VINAY Gilles()
ROSENTHAL Jean-Laurent(California Institute of Technology)
Dark Matter Credit, The development of peer-to-peer lending and banking in France. Princeton University Press, 2019
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 01/10/2019 de 17:00 à 18:00
BOCK Sebastien ()
Routine-Biased Technological Change and Hours Worked over the Business Cycle
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 01/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ARIELL Reshef ()
Are Your Labor Shares Set in Beijing? The View through the Lens of Global Value Chains
We study the evolution of labor shares while taking into account international trade based on value added concepts. On average, labor shares decline significantly in 1995-2007 and then recover somewhat in 2007-2014. Skilled labor shares increase strongly and uniformly throughout 1995-2014. Globalization consistently pushes labor shares down due to greater reliance on intermediate input trade, which is relatively capital intensive; complex global value chains are an important dimension of this process. Within-industry changes account for the reversal in the decline in labor shares after 2007, and almost all of the increase in skilled labor shares; we explain this by declines in the price of capital in the presence of capital-skill complementarity, together with within-industry forward GVC integration. Compared to shares in GDP, labor shares in gross national product (GNP) are higher in countries with positive net FDI positions; the uneven spread of multinational activity contributes to greater inequality through this channel.